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The development of the global capital market is a tale of two systems.
While these systems should in principle reflect one another, their
development has in fact diverged considerably. The international capital
market has thrived and grown to unimaginable levels, however its
regulation has stagnated and remains trapped in a different era.
Globalization has brought with it a flourishing of the international
capital market which has fundamentally changed the global economy. The
magnitude and variety of international debt transactions that occur daily is
truly astounding. However, the regulatory regime governing this market
has lagged severely behind its economic growth, leaving both investors and
the global economy vulnerable to manipulation and potential economic
disaster. This paper will examine the proliferation of the global debt market
in a relatively unregulated climate, highlighting the disjunction between
governance and the actual state of the market.
This paper will begin by exploring the operation of the international
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capital market focusing on the specific issue of securitization. To illustrate
the operation of this market instrument, we will examine a peculiar
relationship between a grandmother living in Japan and her grandson living
in the United States. This peculiarity-unbeknownst to either of them-
operates within the complex, opaque realms of the global capital market.
Through the medium of the grandmother-grandson relationship, this paper
will explore the process of securitization, and demonstrate the chain linking
one grandmother's pension savings to her grandson's first home purchase.
And, in telling this tale, we will discuss the possible legal and economic
dangers inherent in this relationship.
This portion of the paper will then move on to focus on U.S. mortgage
backed securities as an illustration of the implications of securitization to
the global market. This discourse is particularly important, as at the time
this paper was being written, the dangers of securitization were exposed in
the U.S. mortgage-backed securities market, and an important segment of
the industry was reduced to rubble. This industry demolition-that is, this
market failure--demonstrates a serious deficiency in the operation and
regulation of the international capital market. Part one of this paper will
therefore conclude by introducing the need for international action to
prevent recurring market abuses and potential economic disaster.
Part two of this paper examines the regulation, or lack thereof, of the
international capital market. Worldwide, regulation occurs predominantly at
the domestic level and this section will explore this approach by focusing on
the US domestic securities regime's effect on the international market. It
will be argued that the international debt market has outgrown the national
approach to governing securities transactions and that it is now time for
greater coordination at the international level. In that vein, the achievements
and failings in attempts at international securities regulation to date will be
examined. This section will explore intergovernmental initiatives,
agreements between domestic regulators, and the role of credit rating
agencies as de facto market gatekeepers. This paper will conclude by making
recommendations to improve the current international framework and, more
importantly, will call for the creation of an international credit organization
to regulate and guide the operation of the global capital market.
The economic tie between a grandmother and grandson half a world
apart demonstrates the international integration of the capital market. It is
also representative of millions of ungoverned relationships which
characterize the current operation of the global capital market. The rise and
fall of the U.S. mortgage backed securities market is a demonstration of the
risks associated with the unregulated capital market growth of international
capital. At this moment there is a very real threat that the U.S. mortgage
crisis could contribute to a sustained recession, if not an international
financial crisis. The time has come for the global community to focus its
attention on improving the regulation of international debt.
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PART I: SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKET
A. SECURITIZATION OF DEBT
The international debt market allows states and private enterprises to
attract capital from all corners of the globe. It gives national, institutional,
and individual investors seemingly limitless opportunities to invest money
in a borderless market. Capital markets transcend domestic borders and
new investment instruments are continuously being created in an effort to
capitalize on the international flow of debt. This paper will focus on one
such instrument which is rapidly becoming a major shaping force in the
global capital market. Asset securitization has emerged as a primary means
of capital formation and attracts trillions of dollars in investments. Its use
has proliferated internationally and plays a vital role in the flow of global
capital as it is considered the fastest growing sector of credit markets.'
Securitization is a means of dispersing risk amongst a wide group of
investors and reducing risk exposures of financial institutions.' It involves
assets which generate cash flows such as mortgages, credit card receivables
and equipment leases.3 The primary form of securitization is that of
mortgages, however, any asset which generates regular cash payments can
be securitized.4 Securitized assets5 are a more specific assumption of
investment risk than typical securities because they essentially transfer the
risk of debt obligations and their fulfillment, to the investor.6 In exchange
for assuming the risks of default on the underlying asset, investors receive
1. Kinill Glukhovsky & Joseph Tanega, CDOS Under Siege: Part 1: Compliance Under the 1AS
and Basel II, J.I.B.L.R. 2006, 21(11), 652-668 at 652 (2006). ("Glukhovsky")
2 J. Deacon, Global Securitization and CDOs xi (John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 2004)
3. David G. Glennie et al., Securitization xx (London: Kluwer Law International 1998)
4. Examples include automobile, aircraft, equipment and municipal leases, credit card
receivables, retail and trade receivables, purchase contracts for natural resource assets, non-performing
student and home loans, for a complete list please see Id. at 205.
5. The process of securitization pools together cash flow generating assets and creates contractual
rights over these cash flows through a process called optimization. The benefits and risks of this pool
are transferred to investors through the sale of securities. Investors inherit the risk that this regular cash
flow will not materialize if the pool of debtors is unable or unwilling to make their payments The
value of the security is dependent on the value and performance of the underlying assets. For additional
information see Glukhovsky, supra note 1, at 653.
6. A distinction between traditional securities and asset-back securities is that investing in
traditional shares of a company is an equity investment by which the investor assumes a bundle of
ownership rights in a company. Equity investors assume a share of the financial gain of a company's
success and a share of loss in case of failure which is reflected in the stock price. Asset-Backed
Securities involve assets which generate regular and predictable cash flows. The purchaser of an asset-
backed security does not have a stake in the underlying asset but rather an interest in the cash flow
generated by that asset. Essentially, the rate of return is offered to compensate for the risk of default by
the debtor.
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higher rates of return than more secure investments like Government bonds.
Unlike corporate investments, these fixed income assets do not have the
potential to exceed expectations.7 Fixed income assets can either meet
expectations through repayment of the principle and interest according to
schedule, or suffer a loss. In other words the only way to go is down.
Although securitized assets typically offer higher yields than government
issued securities there was confidence that certain types, such as those
created by pools of mortgages, were of low risk and therefore suitable
alternatives to investment in government treasury bonds (such faith no longer
exists). Securitized assets are attractive to large institutional investors
because they represent a huge market for investment which offers relatively
high yields. It is these large scale investors, often referred to as
"sophisticated," which have provided a great deal of capital investment in
securitization markets. They also bear a great deal of the corresponding risk.
Securitization involves separating the credit or bankruptcy risk from
an asset.8 By selling loans in the secondary market other institutions
provide funding and credit risk management.9 This detachment allows risk
to be dispersed amongst a wide group of investors and potentially increases
the stability of the finance industry. Securitization has been praised with
reducing the potential of financial shocks and increasing the efficiency and
health of financial markets. According to the IMF Global Financial
Stability report:
There is a growing recognition that the dispersion of credit risk by
banks to a broader and more diverse group of investors, rather than
warehousing such risk on their balance sheets, has helped to make the
banking and overall financial system more resilient. Credit risk transfer
markets tend to shift credit exposures from banks to investors with
liability structures and investment horizons that make them better
suited to hold or trade these risks such as insurance companies, regional
banks, pension funds, mutual funds and increasingly hedge funds. [...]
7. Fixed income assets cannot outperform expectations because they are limited to income which
is owed from debtors. The best case scenario for these securities is that cash flows are received
according to schedule.
8. From a technical perspective this legal separation occurs through the creation of a "Special
Purpose Vehicle" (SPV) or "Special Purpose Entity" (SPE) which assumes legal ownership of the asset
to be securitized. A secuntisation SPE is defined by the Bank for International Settlements as:". . . a
corporation trust or other entity, other than a credit institution, organised for carrying on a securitisation
or securitisations, the activities of which are limited to those appropriate to accomplishing that
objective, the structure of which is intended to isolate the obligations of the SSPE from those of the
originator credit institutions, and the holders of the beneficial interests in which have the right to pledge
or exchange those interests without restriction." Avail at http://www.bis.org/. When these assets have
been transferred to the SPV, it issues securities which represent an entitlement to the benefit of the cash
flows associated with the underlying assets. In exchange for transfernng these cash flow rights the
originator receives cash. For a complete description please see Glukhovsky, supra note 1, 654 and 658.
9. Michael J. Lea, New Directions in Asian Housing Finance, in Models of Secondary Mortgage
Market Development 16, (International Financial Corporation, 1998), ("Lea").
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Transferring credit risk from banks via the capital markets helps to
make the banking system, including smaller banks, less vulnerable to
credit shocks. 1o
Securitization is a huge player in the international debt market, both as
a source of capital and by improving the financial position of institutions
due to their "off-balance sheet treatment."" The risks of default are not be
borne by the financial institution because the assets and liabilities have
been exchanged for cash,12 improving the firm's balance sheet and reducing
capital reserve requirements. However, there is a growing skepticism
towards these alleged benefits with some arguing that "the benefits of
securitization to date have rested primarily upon a chance combination of a
lengthy economic expansion coupled with asset price increases." 3
1. Dangers of Securitization
While the benefits of securitization have been carefully analyzed, the
corresponding risks have not received the same consideration. Until
recently, few studies have been conducted regarding the effects transferring
credit risk may have on regional and global financial stability.'
4
Securitized assets are often pooled into Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs)"5 which balance underlying assets of various credit qualities.
These instruments are extremely complex and even the savviest of
investors may fail to appreciate their risks. There has been little
international development in the standardization of securitization
transactions or their regulation. 6 This void has allowed the investment
industry to thrive in an unregulated climate.
Investment banks and other private enterprises currently shape the
structure and rules of these instruments and the only true monitors at the
international level are rating agencies who price these securities. The
wisdom of allowing private enterprises, driven by profit, a free reign to
10. International Monetary Fund, The Influence of Credit Derivative and Structured Credit
Markets on Financial Stability, in Global Financial Stability Report A Report by the International
Capital Markets Department on Market Developments and Issues 51, 63 (April 2006). ("IMF").
11. Provided that the securitization process complies with relevant national requirements and
international standards. See Glukhovsky, supra note 1, at 658.
12. Id at 655.
13. Joseph R. Mason and Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings
Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 3, Hudson
Institute, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fiiseaction=hudson-upcoming-events&id=393 (May 2007)
("Rosner").
14. IMF, Supra note 10, at 52.
15. Collateralized Debt Obligations are securities backed by a pool of mortgages and other fixed
income securities. They may contain as few as twenty underlying assets but often contain hundreds.
16. Glukhovsky, Supra note 1, at 652.
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create and distribute instruments of debt comprehensible to a select few
(most of whom are the individuals creating the securities) is questionable at
best. The risks of CDOs are described by Glukhovsky as follows:
What little marketing literature we have on CDOs does not focus on
"accelerated concentration risk", probably because CDOs would then
sound more like Russian roulette than the grand triumphant inventions
of off-balance sheet financial engineering. 7
The complexity of CDOs mask and misrepresent risk transfers through
an opaque grading system which combines investment pools with different
risk exposures. However, credit risks do not disappear and are simply
shifted to other areas of the market. There is increasing concern that
investors may be unaware of the risks associated with these investments
and find themselves incurring losses based on representations made by
securities issuers. The complexity and lack of transparency of securitized
assets has allowed investor ignorance to be manipulated for profit and this
will likely be reflected in widespread securities litigation.
The U.S. has been the global leader in the development of the
securitization industry. According to a recent study by Fitch ratings they
are also the undisputed leader in defaulting on these instruments with the
US accounting for 97% of structured finance defaults worldwide from
1991-2005.18 The creation of the global debt market allows institutions to
shift credit risks outside of the domestic market. Credit risk is now spread
across the global economy and therefore negative credit cycles can be more
easily absorbed. Unfortunately, the explosion of such a large unregulated
market has led to irresponsible behaviors within the finance industry.
[T]he ability to transfer risk may create incentives for banks to
overextend credit and assume excessive credit risk. Others have raised
questions about the potential for risk transfer to adversely affect
financial stability by reducing incentives for banks to screen and
monitor borrowers.'
9
Securitization has altered the risk paradigm in the U.S. mortgage market,
thus leading to widespread and systemic improprieties.
B. MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
Keeping this technical background in mind it is now time to breathe
life into this concept of securitization and demonstrate how it can link an
17. Id. at 655.
18. Fitch IBCA, Fitch Global Structured Finance 1991-2005 Default Study, (Nov. 26, 2006),
available at http://www.fitchratings.com/dtp/pdf4-06/5fit I 128.pdf.
19. IMF, supra note 10, at 71.
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American homeowner to a foreign investor. This section will explore the
diversification and exportation of US mortgage risk through securitized real
estate loans, known as Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) ° and how this
perpetuated the U.S. housing boom and created rife conditions for
malfeasance. Let us examine a peculiar relationship between Hiro, an
American of Japanese decent and his grandmother Kayori who lives in
Japan. Hiro lives in California; although intelligent, he has not found his
passion in life and has been content to drift between jobs. Hiro has had
occasional problems making credit card payments and has a limited credit
history. He is a member of a credit class known as sub-prime. Unlike
Hiro, his grandmother did not take long to settle into her career. At twenty-
one Kayori became a nurse and remained so until she retired at sixty.
Although very cautious with her savings a portion of her paycheck was
regularly invested into a joint fund for all nurses, known as a pension fund.
Mortgage Securitization
PMncipie nd iinct i d RIgi to Peion P0fl
fmcma- Payroents Irture Pft-ts g =;wiv Pay-fltt W' FRc6,m,,
Moripte Lea= Cash wwt ( hcr Cash Petnt
Securiy Contribution
Pooling ofMort Loons into NMeng*ge.Rckvd Secuiy
1. Mortgage Originators
Hiro has just found his dream home, but to buy it he must borrow
money from a lending institution known as a mortgage originator. The
originator assesses the creditworthiness of mortgage applicants to
determine whether to lend and under what terms or conditions. They are
20. Mortgage-backed securities are instruments which are created and backed by pooling together
mortgages. The basic form of MBS is known as the "pass-through security" which entitles investors to
receive a proportional share of cash flow from the pool of mortgages. This cash flow is the regular
payments of pnnciple and interest paid by mortgage holders. It is the SPV which maintains ownership
of the underlying asset and issues securities which are sold. For definition please see the U.S.
Securities Exchange Commission website avail at http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm-
Mortgage.
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usually responsible for servicing the mortgages and collect payments at
regular intervals.
Traditionally mortgage originators bore the risks of their loans and
therefore had incentive to ensure loan security and repayment. Therefore an
individual like Hiro, with a checkered credit history, could have had a
difficult time obtaining a loan. However, the dynamics of mortgage
lending have been substantially altered with the proliferation of the MBS
market significantly increasing Hiro's chances. As a result of securitization
the mortgage lending business has many participants: "In systems
dominated by the secondary market, mortgage origination tends to have
low barriers to entry and thus is highly competitive and has many
players."" l The incentive and risk structure of mortgage lending has
fundamentally changed. Mortgage originators receive income for lending
and their revenues correspond with the quantity and size of mortgages they
lend. Today most mortgages are sold and packaged into MBS and
therefore mortgage risk is assumed by investors, not the originators.
Secondary mortgage markets increase the flow of capital to housing "by
developing new instruments and institutions that can lower the risks of
mortgage lending for originators and provide them with new funding
outlets."22 This transfer of risk and influx of capital has lowered lending
standards and as a result sub-prime mortgage lending has increased
dramatically in the US market.23 Hiro can now afford his dream home.
The sub-prime industry benefited from lax lending standards and the
willingness of MBS originators to accept loans indiscriminately. This
facilitated the development of "exotic loan products" which made home
ownership accessible to individuals of varying credit positions. These
products vary, but generally they either require very low initial investment
by the homebuyer, pay very little regard to credit history, or both. In the
first category adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) have become a major
form of lending at the sub-prime level. These loans provide short term
benefits to encourage borrowing by offering initially low rates of interest
24
which eventually reset to significantly higher levels. Other examples
include: interest only mortgages which do not require principle payments
in the initial period of the mortgage and piggyback mortgages, where
borrowers receive a mortgage plus a line of credit to cover the mortgage
21. Lea, supra note 9, at 17.
22. Id. at 14.
23. The sub-prime MBS market nearly doubled in 2004 and now represents 21% of MBS issued,
please see David Hale, The Global Driver How Housing is Driving the World Economy, in The
International Economy 30, (Winter 2006), ("Hale"). The share of U.S. housing debt held by private
mortgage-backed securitizations doubled between 2003 and 2005 stood at $401.5 billion according to
Standard & Poor's please see Ruth Simon et al., Housing Bubble Talk Doesn 't Scare Off Foreigners,
(Aug 24, 2005), Wall Street Journal Online,http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI 12484869024321472.html.
24. Some these loans do not even require interest payments in the initial period.
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payments. 2 ' These mortgages allow buyers to purchase more expensive
homes because they are not required to make full payments on their loans
in the initial period. However, these rates are only temporary and are
usually followed by substantially higher rates of interest and repayment
requirements. As these rates begin to reset at the sub-prime level, there is
potential for a huge wave of defaults.26 The second category of loan
products requires little, or no, documentation of the mortgage applicant's
credit position. These include stated income or no doc loans, which do not
require proof or verification of the borrower's income. Such loan products
demonstrate negligence, as well as a lack of accountability and financial
incentive to screen borrowers.
These "exotic loans" present Hiro with what he believes to be a once
in a lifetime opportunity. He has a poor credit history and no funds for a
down payment on his dream home, yet is still eligible to receive a loan.
Customers with low credit ratings are the most profitable borrowers as they
pay the highest rates. They also carry the greatest risk of default.
However, this only matters if originators held the risk, which often they do
not. The development of MBS has fundamentally altered the nature of
mortgage lending because it has created an influx of capital and changed
the matrix of risk. Mortgage originators were able to engage in negligent
lending practices, confident there would be a buyer to for the mortgages.
Issuers of MBS bought all the mortgages they could get their hands on,
recognizing their huge global demand. In fact, many mortgage originators
bear no financial risk of potential loan defaults because they are
compensated by banks and brokerages who act as their creditors.27
Furthermore, mortgage originators often received incentives from banks
and brokerages to market the instruments those lenders wished to sell or
hold. 8
The creation of MBS has allowed mortgage originators to make
negligent loans with the confidence they could be sold to investment banks
or government sponsored agencies and packaged into mortgage-backed
securities. As a result, although Hiro was not in the financial position to
buy a home he was lent the money to do so. Furthermore, the mortgage
originator who lent him the money loses nothing if (or when) Hiro defaults
on his loan.
25. For a more detailed description of sub-prime loan products please see Jonathan R. Lang,
"Coming Home to Roost", (February 13, 2007), Barrons Online, http://online.barrons.com/public/main.
26. The past due rate for all sub-pnme mortgages is 13.33%. Sub-prime mortgages account for
$1.28 trillion or approximately 12.8% of all mortgage debt outstanding. Please see, Subprime and
Predatory Lending. New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated
Institution, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the
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2. Securitizers
After Hiro is granted a loan, it is bought along with thousands of
others by the investment industry. His mortgage joins a pool and at this
point the process of securitization occurs. MBS are created by
amalgamating mortgages and issuing securities which are claims to the
expected interest and principle payments owed by the mortgagees.
Because of the volume, Hiro's ability to make payments becomes of
marginal significance to the pools performance. However, when low
quality mortgages like Hiro's are prevalent, obviously the risks increase.
The balancing of mortgages of various qualities through the creation of
MBS and CDOs, is the business of the securitization industry. In return
billions of dollars in commissions are received.
The two most significant purchasers of mortgages in the U.S. market
are investment banks and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)
Fannie May and Freddie Mac. These purchasers pool and securitize
mortgages for sale to investors and their own holdings. The simplest form
of a MBS is known as the pass-through participation certificate which
entitles the investor to a share of all the principle and interest payments
made on the pool of mortgages. However, MBS often adopt more
complicated schemes29 and incorporate instruments such as derivatives to
balance risk levels. 3' The business of securitizing mortgages is vast and
lucrative. With a seemingly limitless supply, and huge global demand,
billions of dollars have been made. MBS are often sold to large scale
investors such as pension funds and insurance companies. By selling loans
in the secondary market other institutions provide the funding and credit
risk management.31 Securitizers, therefore, do not bear the risk of default on
mortgage payments.32
MBS enjoyed a great deal of market confidence during the U.S.
housing boom, with some even thought of as an alternative to the security
of U.S. Government Treasury Bonds. However, recent events in the U.S.
housing market have shattered this confidence and exposed widespread
misunderstanding of the risks associated with MBS. The most fundamental
misconception relating to MBS is the belief that the pooling of mortgage
loans automatically reduces risk through diversification. The risks of a
29. MBS are usually divided into tranches based upon credit quality and sold to investors offering
different rates of return.
30. Derivatives are used to protect against negative credit events and will be discussed in the
following section.
31. Lea, supra note 9, at 16.
32. Please note that there are some repurchase agreements in the industry which oblige issuers of
MBS to buy back non-performing loans.
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MBS are determined by the quality of mortgage loans which are
accumulated. While adding high quality mortgages reduces risk, obviously
the credit quality of a sub-prime mortgage pool does not improve through the
acquisition of more low quality loans. Furthermore, the state of the real
estate market influences the performance of mortgage-backed assets.
Clearly, securities composed of assets all from one sector are not truly
diversified and their performance is significantly dependant on the health of
the housing market. Members of the securitization industry are guilty of
inspiring false confidence in the MBS market. The industry marketed MBS
as stable instruments insulated from the risks of a housing downturn. These
factors worked in unison to artificially inflate the MBS market by fooling
investors to believe that bad loans could be transformed through the
sophistication of the investment industry. Predictably, this was not the case.
i. Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac create mortgage backed securities. Both
companies pool non-government insured mortgages and rely on private
mortgage insurance. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not government
institutions but rather private corporations. However, they are government
sponsored enterprises33 with a widely referred to implicit government
guarantee against failure. However, it is essential to realize that MBS
issued from these companies are not guaranteed by the US government.
Low quality housing debt is perpetuated by these GSEs who buy this debt
and package it into MBS. Although the fundamental quality of the debt
remains unchanged, it is magically transformed into debt regarded by the
market as high quality, low risk.
By 2003, the portfolio of the two GSEs stood at $1.5 trillion in assets, or
23% of the home-mortgage market. Fannie May and Freddie Mac have an
unclear relationship with the U.S. government. While the prospectus of both
companies indicate that the U.S. government does not insure or otherwise
protect these companies from failure, it is widely believed they are too
important to the U.S. economy for the government to let them fail.34 This
implicit guarantee allows mortgage-backed securities to be regarded as
secure investments even though the assets which underlie them may not be.
Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, has
openly criticized these government sponsored entities for exploiting this
implicit guarantee. In a speech delivered to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta he stated:
33 Both have a $1-billion credit line from the U.S. Treasury and one-third of their boards of
directors are appointed by the president. Please see the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
available at http://www.ofheo.gov/.
34 Please see Dwight M. Jaffe, On Limiting the Retained Mortgage Portfolios of Fannie May and
Freddie Mac, (June 30, 2005), avail able at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/fcreue/fcwp/294.
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The Federal Reserve has been unable to find any credible purpose for
the huge balance sheets built by Fannie and Freddie other than the
creation of profit through the exploitation of the market-granted
subsidy.35
He suggested that these enterprises increased profit through highly
risky investments like sub-prime MBS, stating that:
Because the many counterparties in GSE transactions assess risk based
mainly on the GSE's perceived special relationship to the government,
rather than on the underlying soundness of the institutions, regulators
cannot rely on market discipline to contain systemic risk.36
This so-called "implicit guarantee," resulted in their MBS being
assigned artificially low risk valuations.37
These companies share responsibility for the housing boom and
misrepresentation of the underlying value of MBS. 3' Furthermore, these
quasi-governmental entities have not operated accountably and both have
been rocked by large accounting scandals. 9
ii. Investment Banks
Investment banks marketed MBS as the answer to achieving high
investment yields accompanied by low risk levels. MBS are often
combined into instruments holding mortgages of ranging quality known as
CDOs. These complex structures often utilize derivatives as an insurance
policy for their assets. The premise was that these structures were insulated
from market risk because of their diverse composition. These instruments
received sanction from ratings agencies that were complacent in designing
the securities.
The role of the investment banks in misrepresenting MBS will be
more fully examined when we explore the state of the U.S. housing market
today.
35. The Federal Reserve Board, Remarks by Alan Greenspan on Government-sponsored
enterprises to the Conference on Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the Macroeconomy, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, (May 19, 2005): http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/Speeches/2005/
20050519/default.htm.
36. Id.
37. Jaffe, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. In May 2006, the Secunties and Exchange Commission and the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, the GSEs top regulator, fined Fannie Mae $400 million for its accounting
misdeeds. Among other things, the regulators alleged Fannie Mae executives manipulated accounting in
order to trigger millions in bonuses for executives.
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iii. Derivatives
Securitization spawned the credit derivatives market which exploded
to unprecedented levels and may have severe implications for the global
debt market. These instruments balance credit risks associated with
securitized assets. Derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS) are often
incorporated into securitized assets to hedge, or provide protection in case
of failure of the underlying assets. These instruments are very complicated
but in principle they are designed to act as insurance policies against
negative credit events. They are frequently used to offset the risk of
mortgage defaults within a mortgage pool.
While it is beyond this paper's scope to detail the magnifying effect
derivatives can have on debt markets, a brief introduction is necessary to
understand their role in the sale of securitized assets and the overall risk
they pose to global economic stability. Credit default swaps are basic
derivatives that act as insurance to credit defaults. They operate as an
insurance policy by triggering a payment in the case of a credit event often
defined by a percentage of default on the underlying assets. A seller of a
credit default swap provides protection against negative credit events in
exchange for payment of a premium. If the specific credit event occurs the
seller is obliged to provide compensation to the buyer according to the
terms of the swap agreement. If not, the seller keeps the premium. "
The derivatives market has increased confidence in MBS, and is
promoted as a safety net to protect against negative credit cycles or
widespread defaults within a MBS. However, the derivatives industry has
taken on a life of its own and they are vigorously traded by financial
institutions in an effort to tailor risk exposures. Credit default swaps are
rarely discussed, and even more infrequently understood. Despite this the
current notional amount of credit default swaps is estimated at $26
trillion.4' Unbelievably, this vast industry is almost entirely unregulated.
The complexity of derivatives raises questions regarding whether
investors fully comprehend their underlying risks.42 Timothy Geithner,
40. For example, in order to protect against the risk of mortgage defaults in an investment portfolio
a protection buyer could make bi-annual premium payments to a protection seller. In return for these
payments the seller would pledge to make payment in the event of a specific credit event. A CDS could
be structured so that the insurance payment would be made if 20% of the underlying mortgages went
into default. This is a simplified example and the range of products is only limited by the imaginations
of investment bankers who issue them.
41. According to The International Swaps and Derivatives Association Notional amount of credit
default swaps grew by 52% in the first six months of 2006 to $26.0 trillion from $17 1 trillion. The
annual growth rate for credit derivatives is 109% from $12.4 trillion at mid-year 2005. Eighty-eight
firms provided credit default swap data which Is available at
http://isda.org/statistics/recent.html#2006mid (ISDA). This figure is all the more staggenng if we
consider that the values of such instruments were $536 billion in 2001 according to the Bank for
International Settlements avail at http://www.bis.org/.
42. IMF, supra note 10, at 61.
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president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has warned that the
magnitude of debt and derivatives markets poses a significant threat to the
global financial system. In a recent speech he stated:
The same factors that may have reduced the probability of future
systemic events, however, may amplify the damage caused by,
and complicate the management of, very severe financial shocks.
The changes that may have reduced the vulnerability of the
system to smaller shocks may have increased the severity of
larger ones.43
If deteriorating credit conditions in the U.S. housing market lead to
significant levels of credit events triggering swap payouts a liquidity crisis
could ensue.
The global derivatives market exemplifies the proliferation of
financial instruments in an unregulated climate. A staggering amount of
global capital is linked to this market and directly tied to the MBS market.
The derivatives market allowed investors and financial institutions to
balance credit risks and protect themselves against negative credit events.
These instruments have grown exponentially in conjunction with the rise of
securitization and play an important role in the MBS industry. However,
they have not been tested in a negative economic cycle and could
exacerbate an economic downswing. As the US housing slump worsens
we may have an opportunity to test the resilience of the derivatives market.
iv. Credit Agencies and CDOs
Although credit rating agencies are not securitizers, they play an
integral role in the sale of MBS and the securitization industry. These
agencies are extremely powerful and are arguably the most influential
market regulators." In many ways their ratings created the market
confidence in MBS. In the largely ungoverned realm of MBS and CDOs,
rating agencies are often the only entities which act as a monitor and
evaluator of the performance and value of these securities. Whether a
security is rated as investment grade45 can determine the success of a MBS
structure and whether they can be held by institutional investors.
Credit rating agencies are often active participants in structuring
43. Timothy F. Geithner, Hedge Funds and Derivatives and Their Imphcations for the Financial
System, (Sept 15, 2006) Speech avail at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/
gej060914.html.
44. Thomas L. Friedman has commented that there are two world powers the U.S. and Moody's
credit rating agency. Please see Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down For Credit Rating Agencies, Washington University Law Quarterly, v. 77 No. 3 (1999).
("Partnoy").
45. Investment grade securities are those which receive a credit rating of BBB or higher.
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CDOs.46 Issuers of CDOs refer to rating agency models in the creation of
these instruments and receive input on how to achieve desired ratings.47
These models allow issuers to adapt their structures in response to direction
from the rating agency. Creative structuring and rating agency compliance
allowed billions of sub-prime debt to become investment grade. Ratings
agencies go as far as offering CDO risk management services, allowing
them to judge their own creation.48 This obvious conflict of interest is
currently unregulated and contributes to the lack of appreciation of the
hazards of CDOs.
The majority of the riskiest MBS are held by CDOs with sub-prime
exposures averaging around 45%.49 Structured products like CDOs lack
transparency and do not allow investors to examine the credit quality of the
underlying borrowers who are relied upon for cash flows. The magic of
CDOs has been their ability to transform sub investment grade MBS into
investment grade assets. This has made fortunes for the credit rating
industry and not surprisingly mis-priced securities.5 ° However, risk does
not disappear and the combined credit risk of each mortgage comprising
the pool is the actual risk of that security. In other words, the sum cannot
be less than the parts. Credit agencies are behind this phony transformation
and their ratings provide quasi-official sanction of these securities.
A series of recent reports attack the methodology used by these
agencies to rate CDOs, exposing severe flaws in their rating systems as
well as fundamental conflicts of interest.5" The role of rating agencies in
the operation of the international capital market will be more fully explored
in part two of this paper.
3. The Investors
At the last link of the chain is Hiro's grandmother, unaware has played
an integral role in funding the US housing boom and perhaps Hiro's very
own home purchase. Kayori, like millions of others worldwide, has had a
portion of her employment earnings invested in a pension fund. It is these
46. Partnoy, supra note 44, at 17.
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id.
49. Rosner, Supra note 13, at 16. Mortgage debt is usually divided into "tranches" according to
credit risk. The top tranches are the first to receive cash flows and therefore most secure. The bottom
tranches are the last to receive cash flow and are contingent on all the higher tranches receiving
payment first. Therefore, the lowest tranche will be the first to be effected by non-payment or mortgage
defaults.
50. Unbelievably, 75% of CDOs are rated as AAA, the highest credit rating. Whereas only six
corporations in the entire US receive this rating. Please see Mark Pittman, Moody's May cut $5 Billion
ofSubprime-Backed CDO 's, (July 11, 2007), Bloomberg Online, http://www.bloomberg.com.
51. Please see Rosner, supra note 13, and Partnoy, supra note 44.
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funds in, addition to other large investors such as insurance companies and
hedge funds, which provided the bulk of capital to the MBS market. Even
foreign governments, especially those from Asia, have invested in these
instruments in an attempt to garner higher investment yields.5" A number of
factors make MBS attractive to large scale investors. First, they represent a
near limitless market for investment. Real estate is one of the largest
global stores of wealth and mortgage markets provide the funding for asset
purchases. Second, they offer higher yields than Government Treasury
Bonds and provide investors with an opportunity to increase their returns.
Third, they were regarded as stable low risk investment and received high
ratings from credit agencies. Large scale demand for investment grade
securities with higher yields fuelled the growth of the MBS industry and
encouraged the development of various creative financial products.
These investors, known as "institutional" or "sophisticated", operate
in an unregulated atmosphere as it is assumed they have the knowledge and
market power to protect themselves. According to Green:
Most, if not all, developed markets have a private, largely
unregulated market for certain investors (variously characterized
as institutional, sophisticated or professional) that is an integral
part of the capital raising process.
5 3
The lion's share of investment in the MBS industry came from large
investors. Therefore a high proportion of these securities were unregulated
and not required to meet public disclosure standards. So, although the
underlying investor in a security may be a pension fund contributor like
Kayori there is no obligation for issuers to provide information regarding
their securities to the public. As we shall see many of these professional
investors may not have been as sophisticated as regulators assumed.
III. MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES AND THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET
Housing is of fundamental importance to individuals and nations
alike. Politically, a strong housing market can create support for the
government in power.54 Economically, it means greater national wealth (at
least in monetary terms) and this increases domestic consumption.
52. The MBS market has recently attracted large state investments particularly from Asia. China's
Central Bank is thought to be moving large holdings from US Treasury Bonds to American Mortgage-
Backed Securities and Corporate bonds in an attempt to earn higher yields. Please see China 's Foreign
Reserves: Who Wants to be a Trillionaire, (October 28, 2006), The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.c fm?storyid=8083036.
53. Edward F Greene & Linda C. Quinn, Building on International Convergence of the Global
Markets: A Modelfor Securities Law Reform, 1281 PLI/Corp I I at 7 (200 1). ("Greene").
54. Some commentators point to the US Housing bubbles as the reason behind President Bush's
re-election. See Hale Supra note 23.
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Securitization of mortgage assets helped to drive growth of the U.S.
housing market to unprecedented levels. It has also been credited with
reducing financial instability through diversification of risk. According to
the IMF Global Financial Stability Report, the securitization of mortgage
assets has had the following effects:
Market liquidity and funding have increased with the greater use of
securitization and, more recently, a variety of advanced credit derivative
products. Securitization of this sector has helped to secure a steadier
supply of mortgage finance over time, reducing the volatility of the
provision of housing credit, and possibly contributed to moderating credit
cycle dynamics and output loss"55
However, as securitization has radically changed the dynamics of the
housing industry, it may contribute to the demise of the U.S. real estate
market. The altered risk matrix and complexity of secondary market
instruments has facilitated widespread malfeasance and artificially inflated
asset prices. As the global market realizes this, there will certainly be a
different attitude toward the U.S. market, and it is likely that domestic and
international investment in MBS will begin to dry up.
The U.S.'s real estate market enjoyed a prolonged expansionary
period where house prices rose by 50% in the five-year period leading up
to 2005.56 The low costs of financing home ownership increased demand,
driving house prices to staggering levels, creating what is popularly
known as the U.S. housing bubble. The secondary mortgage market
increased the flow of capital funding into housing and also reduced the
risks for mortgage originators." This phenomenon fuelled a rise in
American home ownership from 64% to 69%.58 MBS were an important
source of capital and an instigator in the housing boom. According to the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board, the residential MBS market reached $5.139
trillion last year.59
The U.S. housing boom was unique in a number of ways. First,
although the increased value of real estate led to greater domestic wealth, the
housing boom was accompanied by a decreased level of domestic savings,60
with the U.S. experiencing persistent negative savings rates.6' A major
reason for this decline in savings was the increase in credit available to the
private sector.62 Why save to buy a home when you can have one now by
55. IMF, supra note 10, at 75.
56. Hale, supra note 23, at 28.
57. Lea, supra note 9, at 19.
58. Blair, supra note 26
59. Foreign Investors, Individuals, Step Up to Plate in Booming Mortgage Securities Market,
Inside MBS & ABS Issue 13, Electronic Edition (March 31, 2006). ("Inside MBS & ABS").
60. Id.
61. The US savings rate is -0.6 percent according to Hale, Supra note 23, at 30.
62. Marco Terrones et al., Chapter II: Global Imbalances. A Savings and Investment and
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visiting your local mortgage lender? The prolonged housing boom in
America increased the asset value of American households, which led to
decreased savings, as home equity replaced savings and personal investments
as a store of wealth. The reduction in American savings reflects the
country's weakened fiscal position and its reliance on foreign borrowing.
In 2005 foreign investors held an estimated $550 billion of Residential
MBS, representing a 10.7% share of the overall market.63  This massive
global influx of investment in MBS contributed to the seemingly endless
supply of capital for mortgage financing and reduced the risks of lending.
Therefore, the relative cost of purchasing a home in the U.S. was lower due
to international investment.
This investment also signified an enormous transfer of housing credit
risk from the domestic market to the international market. With an
increasingly high proportion of default risk absorbed by foreign investors,
lenders increased lending levels and risk exposures. 64 The huge demand for
MBS papers and influx of capital also created conditions susceptible to
questionable practices within the mortgage-backed security industry.
These factors increased mortgage lending from a nominal perspective as
well as from an increased borrowing base. As mentioned previously, the
proliferation of the MBS market facilitated the growth of the sub-prime
mortgage lending industry.65 The sub-prime MBS market nearly doubled in
2004 and represented 21% of MBSs issued.66 Sub-prime loans in 2005 equaled
$625 billion in 2005.67 Essentially, many individuals previously unable to
purchase homes entered the market because of increased lending and reduced
standards. As we shall see it is this sub-prime mortgage industry which has
been the first casualty of the declining U.S. real estate market.
IV. THE U.S. HOUSING BUST
The U.S. housing market has been described as the economic "global
wildcard". 68 During the housing boom all levels of the market benefited
from the growth of MBS. Individuals purchased homes beyond their
means. Mortgage originators were able to proliferate lending through
Investment Perspective, in IMF World Economic Outlook 105, (September 2005). ("IMF I").
63. Inside MBS & ABS, supra note 59.
64. Housing Bubble Doesn't Scare of Foreigners, (August 24, 2005), Wall Street Journal Online,
http://online wsj.com/article/SB I12484869024321472.html.
65. Sub-Prime loans have a higher nsk of default because the borrower is in a poor financial
position relative to the size of the loan.
66. Hale, supra note 23, at 30.
67. Bethany McLean, The Dangers of Investing in Subprime debt, (March 19, 2007), CNN.com,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/forrune-archive/2007/04/02/8403416/index.htm.
68. Hale, supra note 23, at 29.
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indiscriminate screening processes, confident that even the most high risk
mortgages could be sold. MBS issuers became part of one of the greatest
investment sector booms in history and the housing boom was an impetus
for the recent economic success of the U.S.
Everybody wins? Not likely. The U.S. housing boom is over. Prices
across the country have stagnated and in many areas begun to drop. The
U.S. is bracing for its first annual decline in median housing prices since
the Great Depression.69  Strong home-price appreciation since 1998
prevented mortgage delinquencies and defaults from developing into
losses." However, with the softening of real estate prices mortgage
foreclosures in the U.S. have increased by 35% with almost 437,500 filings
reported in the first quarter of 2007. 7 ' The MBS market, once credited with
providing both liquidity and stability is now accused of "providing liquidity
without responsibility."" Homeowners, like Hiro, who received loans
beyond their means, are being subjected to increasing repayment
obligations, and losing their homes and entire neighborhoods are being
affected.
The hardest hit sector of the market has been the sub-prime level.
During the housing boom sub-prime lenders benefited from huge housing
demand and were able to achieve high lending volumes and profit margins.
However, it has come to light that; "sub-prime lenders tried to maintain
volume as the housing market was faltering in late 2005 and 2006 by
making riskier loans."73 Sub-prime mortgages now account for $1.28
trillion and the current past due rate on these mortgages is 13.33%.
74
Since the beginning of 2006, twenty-three sub-prime lenders have
filed for bankruptcy, including the nation's second largest lender, First
National. 75 Over the past twelve months over sixty sub-prime lenders have
ceased operations or solicited buyers.76 This meltdown has resulted from
financing cuts by the banks and brokerages, which previously had
securitized their sub-prime mortgages. This has also coincided with a
69. Kathleen M. Howley, Rate Rise Pushes Housing, Economy to Blood Bath, (June 20, 2007),
Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=akV2sasSGUY8&refer=home
Bloomberg.
70. Rosner, supra note 13, at 7.
71. Mark Pittman, Moody's, S&P Understate Subprime Risk, (May 3, 2007), Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=arbEvwTj 19HQ&refer=home.
72. Democratic Chairman Barney Frank of Massachusetts quoted in James Tyson, Mortgage
Bondholders May Bear Subprime Loan Risk, (April 10, 2007), Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aq3 flDbwBCbk&refer-home.
73. Rosner, supra note 13, at 76.
74. Blair, supra note 26.
75. Christine Richard, Subprime Losers Blame Bear, Credit Suisse, JPM, Morgan Stanley, (April
11, 2007), Bloomberg, http://www.bloombergwealth.net/apps/
news?pid=20602007&sid=av134G5JBAjQ&refer=rates. ("Richard").
76. Rosner, supra note 13, at 28.
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dramatic increase in risk premiums demanded by investors for sub-prime
mortgages and a significant decrease in market liquidity." What was once a
thriving industry has been destroyed.
CDOs, which supplied so much liquidity to the sub-prime market,
could be the next casualty of the sub-prime crisis. The recent downgrading
of $5.2 billion of MBS debt by Moody's rating agency and proposed
downgrade of $12 billion by S&P will have widespread implications for the
CDOs created from these securities." Rating downgrades could pose a dire
threat to the U.S. housing market if it forces institutional investors to sell
their holdings. Not only would insurance and pension funds suffer
significant loses but it could spur a severe liquidity crisis in the U.S.
housing market.79
1. Litigation
As the mortgage industry continues its plunge, litigation is underway
and will surely increase in the months and years to come. Wrongdoings of
the sub-prime lenders have been exposed in the U.S. market. That
members of the sub-prime industry engaged in unethical, fraudulent
lending practices and will be found liable to investors and mortgagees is
beyond doubt. However, the recent wave of bankruptcies of the industry's
major lenders raises questions regarding whether there will be any lenders
left to sue once the housing downturn has run its course.
The role of investment banks who package these sub-prime mortgages
into mortgage backed securities has not been similarly examined and the
relationship of the investment industry to illegal sub-prime lending is now
of tremendous interest to potential plaintiffs worldwide. It is estimated that
in 2006 alone the New York-based securities industry earned $540 billion
turning sub-prime home loans into securities."0 Issuers of mortgage-backed
securities managed to earn huge commissions while detaching themselves
from the risks of the underlying assets. The same cannot be said for
investors who stand to lose up to $100 billion according to Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke."1 Mortgage securitizer's were instrumental in the
rise of the sub-prime industry and in the booming MBS market there was
ample opportunity for negligent loan packaging and misrepresentation of
underlying assets. Finally, the role of credit agencies in evaluating MBS
77. Blair, supra note 26.
78. Barnes, Angela, Rating Agencies Sound Subprime Alarm Bell, (July 11, 2007), Globe and Mail
Online https://secure.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/2007071 1/RAGENCIES 11.
79. Rosner, supra note 13, at 75.
80. Richard, supra note 75.
81. Emily Kaiser, Subprime Losses Could Hit $100 Billion: Bernanke, (July 20, 2007), Reuters
Online, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN 1933365020070719.
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mislead investors is the subject of recent scathing reports which calls their
evaluation techniques and impartiality into doubt.82 Both Moody's and
S&P rating agencies recently reported that they underestimated the levels
of losses that will be suffered in 2006 sub-prime loan pools.83 It is clear the
underlying risks of MBS were not adequately disclosed to investors and
that significant losses will continue to be suffered. What remains to be
seen is if, and to what extent the securitization industry, which profited so
greatly will be forced to compensate losses.
A booming market can mask improprieties but when the market
begins to fail these behaviors can no longer be concealed. There are a
number of class action lawsuits that have been initiated against sub-prime
lenders, which will undoubtedly add to the line of creditors looking to
collect through bankruptcy proceedings in this doomed industry. However,
securitizers were integral to the operation of mortgage originators and
lawsuits are beginning to surface against investment banks that packaged
and sold MBS.
In this regard the recent upholding of a jury finding of liability in a
class action suit against Lehman Brothers Inc., a major American
investment bank is extremely significant.84 First Alliance Mortgage
Company, a sub-prime lender now bankrupt, was found liable for
committing a host of fraudulent and unethical lending practices. Lehman
Brothers Inc.'s relation to First Alliance was that of credit provider for the
issuance of sub-prime loans and underwriter of the company's mortgage-
backed securitizations. A federal jury found that Lehman Brothers
provided financing for First Alliance's mortgage business with the
knowledge that the mortgage lender was involved in fraudulent sales
practices and that the extension of such credit facilitated this fraud. The
jury held Lehman Brothers liable in tort under the California law for aiding
and abetting85 this fraudulent lending scheme.86 The Court of Appeals
affirmation of this jury finding is a significant step towards imposing
liability against investment banks that were instrumental to the rise of the
secondary mortgage market. While this verdict is specific to fraudulent
lending practices, it has important implications to the overall industry
82. Rosner, Supra note 13, & Partnoy, Supra note 44.
83. Rosner, Supra note 13, at 80.
84. First Alliance Mortgage Company v Chisick, 298 B.R. 652, (2003) upheld in First Alliance
Mortgage Company v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., 471 F.3d 977, (2006).
85. Under California Law aiding and abetting liability may be found where the alleged aider and
abettor (a) knows the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortuous result and the person's own conduct separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person. Saunders v Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 33 Cal. RPTR.2d 438, 446, (1994).
86. The jury calculated total damages at $50,913,928 and held Lehman to be liable for 10% of that
figure. Please note that although the Federal Court of appeal upheld the jury's finding of liability
against Lehman the have remanded the issue of quantum of damages back to a lower court.
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because it represents a link in the chain of liability between mortgage
originators and the firms responsible for their securitization.
On one level this provides defrauded parties potential for financial
redress where a sub-prime originator is insolvent. However, it also raises
questions regarding the integrity of the securitization industry as a whole.
Where liability is found based on knowledge of fraudulent lending
practices it follows that the complacent party should have also been aware
of the risks associated with these assets. If securitizers knew that sub-
prime lenders were making bad loans, they must have known that the
securities created from these loans were not stable investments.
The parties involved in the securitization of mortgage loans include all
major American investment banks, as well as government sponsored
Fannie May and Freddie Mac. With the demise of a major proportion of
sub-prime mortgage originators and the spate of allegations against their
negligent and fraudulent lending practices, the potential exists for an
explosion in litigation. Predatory lending and the use of so-called exotic
loan products, such as option ARMs, were widely known and reported
throughout the finance industry. It is difficult to believe that within this
industry, composed of the world's leading financial minds, participants
were unable to comprehend that mortgage securities are not worth more
than the assets that underlie them.
Legal action is commencing against the investment industry. Bear
Steams, a leading U.S. investment bank, is currently under investigation for
its March 1, 2007, ratings upgrade of New Century Financial. This
upgrade came only eight days before the Company's stock declined 94%. s7
Furthermore, it has recently been reported that Credit Suisse Group, an
investment bank who sold bonds backed by sub-prime mortgages, has been
sued by a Florida insurer named Banker's Life Insurance Co.8" According
to the plaintiffs law firm, a number of other similar claims are in
progress.9 The claims against Credit Suisse include: accepting inferior
loans, understating losses, and covering up delinquencies.9° It is more than
likely that these and other illegal practices were widespread throughout the
securitization industry.
There is widespread speculation that pension funds and insurance
companies are holding a high proportion of the risk associated with the
87. Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin has issued subpoenas to investigate Bear
Stems rating upgrade please see Julian Delasantellis, The Subprume Dominoes in Motion, (March 16,
2007) Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes com/atimes/GlobalEconomy/IC 16Dj04.html.
88. Bankers Life v. Credit Suisse, 07-cv-00690, U.S. District Middle Court, Middle District of
Florida.
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U.S. sub-prime market.9' If conditions continue to deteriorate and losses
begin spreading to higher rated mortgage debt there may be severe
consequences to the health of these institutions and the millions of
individual investors worldwide they represent. Furthermore, the timing of
large foreign investments in MBS is such that issuers were likely aware of
the impending crisis in the market. It is extremely difficult to accept that
the investment industry was unaware of the true value (or lack thereof) of
the assets underlying these investments.
V. CONCLUSION
Securitization perpetuated the U.S. housing bubble and resulting
malfeasance within the mortgage finance industry. The harm created by
irresponsible and fraudulent actions will be felt by the U.S. housing
industry, its economy, and foreign investors. The downturn of the U.S.
housing market will expose the need for greater regulation and oversight of
global debt markets. This is crucial to protect investors from potential
abuse and to ensure the stability of international economy.
The MBS industry has demonstrated how capital markets can be
abused at each level of operation. From the consumer who purchases an
unaffordable house, to the mortgage lender who makes a bad loan, to the
government-sponsored agency which implicitly guarantees this loan, to the
investment bank which misrepresents these securities domestically and
internationally to garner enormous commissions, the market was
systematically manipulated. This harmed millions of people across the
U.S. whose financial positions are in jeopardy due to their mortgage
obligations. Many home purchasers like our hypothetical protagonist Hiro
will lose their homes. As for Hiro's grandmother Kayori, if her pension
fund invested heavily in MBS she may be in for a shock when she goes to
collect. If, and to what extent losses will be felt by pension holders will not
be fully understood in the near future. U.S. MBS attracted a great deal of
foreign investment and this has transferred domestic housing market risks
outside the country's borders. The Japanese nurse whose pension
contributions, indirectly funded an American's home purchase, may suffer
losses if the loan fails. There is no question that people's savings have
been put at risk by the MBS industry and its shady operations.
Disturbingly, there are many questions regarding who has suffered losses
due to the sub-prime market meltdown.92 Clearly a system unequipped to
91. Rosner, Supra note 13, at 75.
92. Alistair Barr, Mortgage crisis to hit holders of risky derivatives Most hedge funds made money,
but some lost; Asian investors fingered, (Apni 2, 2007), Market Watch, http://www.
marketwatch.com/news.
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track the losses of such a significant market failure is inadequate to provide
protection to that market.
Investors and mortgagees are not the only parties at risk from the
bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. The failures of the MBS industry pose
a threat to the economy of the U.S. and are already being reflected in the
country's fiscal position. The U.S. dollar is down 3% from last year93and
there is concern the US may be headed towards a recession.94 Fundamental
fiscal weaknesses in the U.S., like the debt imbalance, have been masked
by the country's economic success. However, this success has been largely
fuelled by asset bubbles which artificially inflated the wealth of the
country. As the value of U.S. real estate declines it may become apparent
that they mortgaged their future to maintain domestic consumption. From
a global economic point the MBS market is an example of an inefficient
use of global capital, instead of contributing to building productive
capacities, such as research and development, international financial
resources were used to sustain consumption and the U.S. housing boom.
This is indicative of the failure of the international capital market to
efficiently allocate capital. The following statement illustrates the current
state of affairs:
[A] more efficient international capital market is supposed to ensure
that capital is allocated to the most productive use. Yet much of the
recent inflow of foreign money into America is not financing
productive investment, but a housing bubble and a consumer binge.
95
The U.S. housing market helped to sustain a high level of domestic
consumption but failed to generate true growth.
The securitization of assets also created an unregulated market which
proliferated without any true understanding of the potential consequences
to the global economy. How the derivatives market will respond to an
economic contraction remains to be seen but it could increase and prolong
the severity.
The fate of the international economy lies in capital markets, but their
regulation remains in an infantile state. The second part of this paper
describes the international legal regime and its influence, or lack thereof,
on the global capital market. It will become clear that although the global
capital market drives the world's economy, no one is behind the wheel.
The continued neglect of the international securities market by the global
community creates tremendous risks and raises important questions which
93. Rosner, Supra note 13, at 80.
94. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Edward Greenspan has suggested there is a 1/3 probability
of an economic recession other commentators suggest higher. Please see Howley, Supra note 69
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will be addressed in the following section. What has become starkly
obvious is that international capital markets need better regulation and far
greater transparency. It would be truly unfortunate if it took an economic
catastrophe to mobilize the world into action.
PART II: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAMEWORK
The global capital market is vast, complex, and has re-shaped the
world's economy. International debt transactions are commonplace and
domestic borders have lost their meaning. The globalization of debt
markets has created tremendous potential for the efficient allocation of
capital and a huge market for investment. However, these opportunities are
accompanied by dangers to market participants and the international
economy. The operation of the U.S. MBS market is an example of the
integration of financial markets and some of the dangers which arise as a
result. The unprecedented levels of domestic and foreign investment into
U.S. mortgage debt perpetuated systemic industry-wide abuses which
temporarily enriched the U.S. housing market while simultaneously
spreading risk to investors worldwide. Although this created a thriving real
estate market will ultimately injure market participants such as investors
and mortgagees.
These risks may have been avoided through stronger regulation, greater
transparency, and better international coordination. The increasing
integration and complexity of the international capital market necessitates the
creation of an international regulatory body. The aims of such a framework
should achieve two objectives. The first is to protect market participants. In
our example we discovered how both Hiro and his grandmother were victims
of a debt market dominated by private industry. Hiro may lose his home and
go bankrupt and Kayori's pension fund may suffer losses (or worse), leaving
her less money with which to enjoy her retirement. However, the current
regulatory system does not recognize these unfortunate circumstances or
effectively govern international debt relationships.
A second major objective is to ensure the health of the international
economy. The U.S. housing market has entered a period of decline. Just as
the MBS industry contributed to the housing boom it will likely perpetuate
the downturn of the U.S. market and could lead to a recession felt worldwide.
The dangers of securitization arose due to a lack of information and
understanding of these instruments. The international capital market must
develop in a way that is transparent and allows regulators and market
participants to understand the nature of investments. The global economy
cannot afford to have trillions of dollars moving through murky international
networks of investment, controlled by private industry.
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The flow of capital transcends national borders and creates strong
interdependence of world markets. However, advancements in the fields of
international oversight and regulation have not accompanied capital market
development. The following passage co-written by former Director of
International Affairs of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Michael D. Mann, describes the necessity of international initiatives aimed
at regulating the market:
The globalization of the securities market and the growing
interdependence of the world's economies have fostered a need for the
international community to be able to respond to prevent potential cross
market disruption.
96
Currently, international securities laws deal with the coordination and
application of domestic law, neglecting the greater realities of an
international capital market. Furthermore, large segments of this market
remain ungoverned. Both the derivatives market and sophisticated
investors are largely unregulated by either domestic or international
legislation. Lack of international oversight and regulation has left the
global capital market vulnerable and allowed private enterprises to flourish
in the void.
Part two of this paper examines the current legal framework which
governs the international securities trade. Securities regulation remains
largely a domestic enterprise and the first section will focus on domestic
legislation of the U.S. and how this regulatory scheme applies to
international securities transactions. The U.S. was chosen as a
representative system because it is arguably the most sophisticated and is
actively involved in international matters. The second section describes
existing securities law initiatives at the international level including state,
industry, and private regulation. This paper will conclude by examining
how to remedy the current system so that regulation is more reflective of
the realities of the global capital market.
A. THE NATIONAL APPROACH
Regulation of the international capital market occurs predominately at
the domestic level. National security regimes attempt to affect the
international market by regulating their respective domestic domains and
the international transactions connected to these markets. The starting
point for examining the legal infrastructure of the international capital
market are the traditional rules of conflict of law found in the principles of
96. Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities
Enforcement, 1544 PLl/Corp 179, 179 (2006).
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private international law.97  These laws, as they relate to securities,
generally focus on conflicts of law between jurisdictions and the
appropriate law to apply in a dispute.
The general position with regards to securities is that lex situs, the law
of where a thing is situated, governs choice of law.98 However, this
application is artificial when dealing with securities which are more akin to
intangible assets than physical property and therefore less amenable to
occupying a physical location. As a result uncertainties can arise as to what
constitutes the lex situs of a security.99 There is debate as to whether this
should be where the issuer is incorporated, or where the share certificates are
registered.'0° The leading texts dealing with conflict of laws assert that the
location of shares is the register at which they reside.'However, merely
identifying which national law applies to securities transactions does little to
improve protection for market participants and the health of the overall
market. Furthermore, there remains uncertainty within the private
international law approach to securities law and this highlights one basic
difficulty of applying conventional laws to an evolving market. It is argued,
"The preoccupation with seeking the situs for shares is an impediment to the
development of rational choice of law rules in this growing area."'0 2 It also
demonstrates the futility of attempting to regulate an international market
through domestic regimes that possess very different securities laws and
regulations. Current international initiatives focus largely on clarifying
conflict of law rules while neglecting the reality that an international
integration of securities frameworks is the true way forward for capital
market regulation.
To this point domestic regulation has facilitated the development of
the international market and international securities law remains primarily
concerned with the interaction of domestic regimes. While it is clear this
97 The leading texts on this topic are Albert V. Dicey & J.H.C. Morris, Dicey & Morris The
Conflicts of Laws, (13th ed., 2000) and James Fawcett & Peter North, Chesire & Norths's Private
International Law, (13th ed.,1999) ("Chesire & North").
98. Dicey & Morris the authoritative text on conflicts of law states that, questions regarding title to
shares are governed by the law of Situs, at 983 Please also see .Maisie Ooi, Shares and other Securities
in the Conflict of Laws, (2003) ("Ooi").
99 The Prwy Council has commented that "There are [...] so many qualities of a share which are
attributable to different places it would seem to follow that there cannot be a proper local habitation for
a share at all." Brassard v. Smith, AC 371, (1925).
100. The case of Macmillan Inc v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc and others (no.3) confirmed
that the law of situs applied to shares, however the court was divided as to whether this should be the
location where the shares are registered of the place of incorporation of the issuer. Macmillan Inc v.
Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc and others (no 3) 1 WLR 387, (1996).
101. The reasoning behind this assertion is that the court where the register is located maintains
jurisdiction over the register. The location of the register of non-negotiable shares is usually where the
issuing company resides and therefore possesses the most substantial connection to the securities
transaction. Chesire & North, supra note 97 at 823.
102. Ooi, supra note 98, at 322.
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system is inadequate to regulate the global capital market, it is important to
understand how domestic securities regimes have nonetheless managed to
facilitate capital transactions extending far beyond their borders. To
illustrate this phenomenon the following section will focus on the most
influential regulator of capital in the world, the United States.
1. U.S. CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION
Governance and regulation of the international capital market remains
severely underdeveloped and this has led to domestic regimes to become
active at the international level. The U.S. long-arm approach to securities
regulation and enforcement has expanded to the regulatory void and plays an
important role in the international securities market. The U.S. securities
market encourages foreign investment because it is regarded as stable,
profitable and the most vigilant guardian of investor rights. It has set the
standard simultaneously for liberalization and regulation and as a result is the
largest recipient of global capital. Their securities regime is of importance to
international securities law for a number of reasons. First, as it is considered
a world leader in regulation, it is extremely influential in the global
convergence of domestic security regimes. The implied strength and
comprehensive nature of the U.S. securities regime is an important reason for
its dominant role in the global capital market. Second, as Greene states,
"[h]istorically, the United States has been the most open of all markets," ' 3
attracting a great deal foreign investment. Third, American courts and
legislatures have not hesitated to apply their laws to international securities
matters. Fourth, U.S. courts are regarded as very hospitable venues to
commence litigation because of their tendency to make large rulings and
availability of plaintiff-friendly legal conditions. The combined result is the
U.S. legal system has transcended the role of a traditional state and reached
the level of an international entity. However, the failure of the U.S.
securities regime to prevent massive securities fraud in their market has
demonstrated that this pillar of regulation cannot effectively govern its own
market let alone an international one. Furthermore, developments in the
world of finance have made it increasingly unrealistic for domestic regulators
to govern international transactions.
The following section deals with U.S. judicial and legislative activism
at the international level and its role in the international market. The
second section focuses on why the U.S. is so attractive to foreign litigants.
The third section will analyzes the limitations of the national approach
considering the U.S.'s failure to protect foreign investors from misfeasance
in the MBS market.
103. Greene, supra note 57, at 16.
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A. U.S. Securities Regime
U.S. regulation and enforcement has emerged in the void of an
international framework with the U.S. judicial system often behaving as a
court of international jurisdiction in matters of securities law. The
American securities regime is governed by the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) °4 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act), °5 legislation passed in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash.
These Acts provide the structure for securities regulation and enforcement
domestically and are also applied to international transactions connected to
the U.S.
The application of the U.S. legislation has tremendous implications for
the international securities market. A body of U.S. case law has established
the courts broad jurisdiction over securities transactions. U.S. courts have
extended their jurisdiction to international matters to protect its citizens
from fraud committed abroad and to protect foreigners from fraud
committed in the U.S. Famously, the court in Schoenbaum1°6 stated that:
We believe that Congress intended the exchange act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the
domestic securities market from the effect of improper foreign transactions
in American securities.' 0 7
The Exchange Act has been interpreted to extend U.S. jurisdiction
beyond domestic borders. A key provision in section 10(b) prohibits fraud
by the "use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails in connection with the purchase of sale of any security."'0 8 This
seemingly innocuous provision apparently did not envision interstate
commerce as domestic transactions which cross U.S. state borders. Rather
the Act defines interstate commerce to include "trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication... between any foreign country and any
state."'0 9 Based on this the judiciary has enforced U.S. securities laws in a
broad range of cases. Furthermore, the Securities Act provides that: "Any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.""'  This
104. Securities Act, 1933, 15 U.S.C. s 77n ("Securities Act").
105. Securities Exchange Act, 1934, 15 U S.C. S 78 ("Exchange Act").
106 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 200 at 206 (2nd Cir. 1968).
107. Id.
108. Exchange Act 10 (b), supra note 108.
109 Id, Definitions.
110 Securities Act 14, supra note 107.
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indicates that compliance with U.S. securities regulation is a condition for
the validity of any securities transactions and encourages securities law
convergence on U.S. terms.
U.S. jurisdiction in cases of international securities law has been
applied extraterritorially based on two distinct principles. The "effects
approach" allows U.S. jurisdiction to be applied to cases where American
investors are harmed by actions committed in another country."' This
encompasses acts which affect the U.S. investment market, so any fraud
committed in a foreign country that causes a loss to American citizens
could qualify as within U.S. court jurisdiction.
The second approach, known as the "conduct approach,""I. 2 provides
protection to foreign investors against conduct occurring in the U.S. which
contributes to securities fraud. The justification for asserting this
jurisdiction is that congress would not want the U.S. used as a base of
operations from which to "defraud foreign securities purchasers or
sellers."" 3 The court in Kauthar went so far as to say that jurisdiction could
be asserted even if fraud was not committed in the U.S. The court stated
that if activities in furtherance of such fraud were undertaken, "this conduct
must be more than merely preparatory in nature; however, we do not go so
far as to require that the conduct occurring domestically must itself satisfy
the elements of a securities violation."'' 14
Under this interpretation the U.S. courts can exercise jurisdiction over
an act of securities fraud affecting a foreign claimant even if it was not
committed in the U.S. Based on this jurisprudence it is evident that U.S.
courts have accepted the role of policing international securities fraud
committed domestically, or abroad, so long as there is a connection
between the activity and the U.S. By extending jurisdiction to international
matters, the U.S. judiciary has signaled to foreign investors that their rights
will be protected. The extension of domestic jurisdiction to international
transactions has perpetuated the national approach to securities regulation.
This is augmented by the fact that many domestic and foreign claimants are
attracted to the U.S. court system for resolution of international disputes.
B. Attractiveness of U.S. Courts
The American judiciary has not shied from protecting domestic
interests from foreign malfeasance. Furthermore, the scope of jurisdiction
111. Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud: Broadening
the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 679, 693 (1999).
112 Id. at 695
113. KautharSDNBHD v. Sternberg, Ind, 149 F.3d 659(1998 C.A. 7).
114 Calhoun, supra note 111, at 667.
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applied by the U.S. judiciary extends to cover harms which originate or
contributed to by activity on U.S. soil. The motivation for this application
raises questions; however, the result is clear: foreign claimants can use the
U.S. court system to make securities claims. Both U.S. and foreign
claimants recognize the advantages of litigating international matters in
U.S. courts. With his usual panache Lord Denning describes this
phenomenon: "As a moth is drawn to light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States." '115 A host of reasons can be advanced for this magnetism,
the foremost of which is the U.S. courts' worldwide reputation for
generosity. The U.S. also possesses stringent securities regulations
increasing the chances that marginal practices would constitute a violation.
Jack B. Weinstein, a senior district Judge, attributes the attraction of global
disputes to U.S. jurisdiction to four factors." 6 First, U.S. procedural and
jurisdictional rules are generally helpful to plaintiffs." 7  One such rule
which is highly relevant to securities litigation is 23(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which permits class action lawsuits." 8  Securities
litigation is very amenable to class actions because shares are often held
amongst large numbers of investors who hold similar interests and are
subject to common harm. Class actions allow individual investors to
pursue compensation with minimal effort and often do not require a
contribution of resources. The availability of class action lawsuits
represents an opportunity for large groups to litigate, unavailable in many
foreign jurisdictions. The wave of class action suits filed in the wake of the
tech bubble burst is a good example of class action suits in securities
litigation. Second, U.S. courts tend to award high monetary judgments." 9
This factor obviously offers great incentive to litigate and can inspire
claimants to file suit even if a different jurisdiction bears a more significant
connection. 2' Third, substantive law tends to favor plaintiffs and there is
the possibility of almost limitless punitive damages. 12' Punitive damages
seek to punish wrongdoers and focus on applying an appropriate
punishment based on the resources of the liable party. The securities
115. Stephano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe. US. - Style Securities
Class Actions and the Aquis Communautaire, Journal of Transnational Law and Policy at 286 (2006).
(quoting Lord Alfred Thompson Denning).
116. Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms, II Duke J.
Comp. & Int'l L. 167 (2001) ("Weinstein").
117. Id.
118. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1998), rule 23 states that: One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all the members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
119. Weinstein, supra note 116, at 167.
120. See for example Kauthar, Supra note 119, Richards v Lloyds of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th
Circ. 1998).
121. Weinstein, supra note 116, at 167.
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industry is composed of parties with very deep pockets representing the
potential for huge punitive damages. Fourth, there is a powerful plaintiffs'
bar capable of financing and prosecuting cases."' This is particularly
relevant to class action suits because plaintiffs are able to file suit without
advancing any resources. The U.S. judiciary's liberal approach to
international enforcement of securities issues and the attractiveness of its
courts have combined to make the U.S. a major center of securities litigation.
C. Limitations of the Domestic Approach
The U.S. capital market is regarded as one of the most regulated and
transparent in the world. By enforcing some of the world's strictest
securities regulations and offering the largest verdicts, the U.S. is in effect
inviting foreign claimants to use its court system. As a result the U.S.
market attracts a great deal of foreign capital allowing the country to
sustain high levels of domestic spending. However, although U.S. law and
policy extends its influence to international markets it is becoming
increasingly ineffective. Capital markets operate without regard for
national borders and it is unrealistic to rely on national regulation to limit
international activities.
Recently, the reputation of the U.S. securities framework as world
leader was severely damaged. The failure of the U.S. capital market to
detect and prevent the massive frauds and eventual collapse of Enron and
WorldCom demonstrate flaws in its regulation and operation. If the sub-
prime crisis continues to spread, the reputation of the U.S. market could
impair its ability to attract investment. U.S. MBS received large amounts of
foreign investment this paper has suggested they may have been
manipulated by domestic issuers. If this claim is substantiated by foreign
claimants through securities litigation it would demonstrate the failure of
U.S. regulation to protect foreign investors. Securitization of U.S. real
estate assets perpetuated a housing bubble in part because international
investors did not have the information to accurately assess the worth of
these investments. If foreign institutional investors end up suffering a
disproportionate share of the loss, it would further damage the reputation of
the U.S. market.
The prospect of the U.S. securities regime governing the international
market is unrealistic. The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is
the watchdog charged with regulating over 10,000 publicly traded
companies, investment advisers that manage more than $32 trillion in
assets, and $44-trillion worth of trading conducted yearly on America's
122. Id.
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stock and option exchanges.123 Even with a budget of $905.3 million and a
staff of 3,600 it is impossible for the SEC to prevent major abuses
domestically, let alone police the international market. Therefore,
international resources must be devoted to improving regulation and
oversight.
Disclosure requirements are the greatest source of transparency and
accountability in the securities market. In order for the international
market to function safely disclosure must provide market participants with
accurate information by which to make investment decisions. However,
the internationalization of the capital market provides impediments to the
creation of a comprehensive and rigorous disclosure standard. If standards
are too costly to comply with or require a level of transparency enterprises
are not willing to meet, this can dissuade issuers from listing on an
exchange. The danger is that a race to the bottom may ensue, with national
regimes offering lax disclosure requirements as a means to attract foreign
investment. This slippery slope can be avoided through the international
coordination of disclosure standards. This could ensure countries are not
punished for protecting investors, and firms would bear the burden of
proving their accountability. With regards to the unregulated sectors of the
capital market, there is a crucial need for greater disclosure; however, the
international nature of these firms could allow them to circumvent any
domestic attempt at forcing disclosure.
The investment industry operates at the international level and is a
prime beneficiary of the shortcomings of the national approach to securities
regulation. There are large gaps between domestic regimes which provide
ample opportunity for firms to adopt marginal practices in pursuit of
profits. Thriving firms, such as investment banks, should be made
accountable to investors and the overall market. The exporting of
mortgage risk is an example of widespread malfeasance perpetrated in a
regulatory void. Unfortunately, the risks associated with investing in
securitized assets were not adequately disclosed and this is the major cause
of difficulties surrounding the U.S. MBS market.
The domestic approach to international capital market regulation does
not reflect the realities, a fact long realized by the investment industry. The
current international infrastructure has no hope of providing meaningful
regulation. It may require a large market failure like the Great Depression
to spur action, but the opportunity exists now to prevent such failures. This
can only be achieved by coordinated international initiatives.
123. Testimony Concerning Fiscal 2008 Appropriation Requests, before the U.S. House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Financial services and General Government Committee on
Appropriations, (Testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman SEC) (March 27, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov.
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAMEWORK
Governance of the international capital market involves a patchy
framework of domestic laws, proposed initiatives, and limited agreements.
This system has thus far served its purpose in facilitating cross border
investments. However, the current focus on regulation and enforcement at
the national level neglects the reality that the international trade in
securities has long since outgrown domestic borders. The regulation of the
international debt market can be analogized to a nation governed at the
state level without a federal level to determine the interaction between
these states or guide the country as a whole. Greene, a leading scholar on
international securities regulation, describes the situation as follows:
Securities regulatory regimes around the world, largely developed on
the conceptual basis of segregated national markets, are fast being
outpaced by market developments and are finding themselves unable to
address effectively the realities of the accelerating integration of global
capital markets. 1
24
The general objectives of securities regulation are to create market
efficiency, protect investors, enforce regulation and ensure the stability of
the overall market. 25 Currently initiatives are aimed at improving
efficiency and reducing agency costs, while, protection of investors and
stability of the overall market remain largely unregulated at the
international level. The fact that the debt market, of crucial importance to
the global economy, has not been the focus of any meaningful international
initiative is curious indeed. There is a conception within the international
community that coordinated regulation is too immense a task and therefore
international initiatives have been limited in scope. The current state of
affairs favors countries with established securities markets, such as the
U.S., and allows them to attract high levels of capital and spread economic
risks outside national borders. However, the greatest beneficiary of the
absence of international regulation has been the investment industry, which
has flourished in this unregulated climate. This section will focus on what
constitutes the international framework for the trade of securities by
examining coordination at the intergovernmental level, through agreements
between domestic industry regulators and private regulation of the market.
It will conclude with how the regulation of international capital markets
could evolve to provide effective protection to participants and protect
against macroeconomic dangers.
124. Greene, supra note 53, at 13.
125. Michael Hurley, International Debt and Equity Markets: U.S. Participation in the
Globalization Trend, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 701(1994).
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I. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES
Achievements in regulation at the intergovernmental level have been
elusive and insufficient to make any real impact on the international capital
market. Bureaucrats feel that reaching a consensus in the domain of
securities law is unachievable because of the variance in domestic regimes
and associated fields such as corporate, bankruptcy, and tax law.126 While a
range of bilateral and multilateral agreements exist between nations they
deal mostly with issues of cross border enforcement and assistance with
securities investigations. 127  There is currently no international treaty in
force which specifically focuses on the global capital market. More
positively, international initiatives have been undertaken in recognition of
an urgent need to develop uniformity and international consensus in the
securities market. 2006's Hague Convention 128 and UNIDROIT's proposed
convention dealing with intermediated securities129 represent a first step
towards the development of an international framework. However, both
conventions do little to address the two most vital objectives of securities
regulation: protection of investors and stability of the overall market.
Furthermore, these initiatives demonstrate the difficulties of drafting
specific legislation and suggest that international treaty making may not be
a feasible approach to developing the regulation of the international capital
market.
A. The Hague Convention on Indirectly Held Securities
The central role of securities intermediaries is one of the most
important developments of the internationalization of capital markets.
Traditionally, share certificates acted as proof of ownership and individual
investors took possession of these certificates. However, today most
126 B. Sen, Enhancing Legal Certainty Over Securities Held With an Intermediary, in UNIDROIT
Project on Harmonized Substantive Rules Regarding Securities Held With an Intermediary 6, (2005).
127. In absence of any substantive international securities law a variety of bilateral and multi-lateral
agreements have been undertaken in order to ensure that some enforceable law governs securities
transactions. These agreements have created some bridges between domestic regulatory regimes.
However, these efforts at cross-border regulation have been largely restricted to responsive measures
such as information sharing, assistance with investigations, and enforcement of foreign judgments. See
Mann, supra note 96, for a description of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, and Memorandums of
Understanding between national governments and securities regulators.
128. The Hague Convention, Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of
Securities Held with an Intermediary, Convention 36 concluded 5 July 2006. ("Hague Convention").
129. UNIDROIT Committee of Governmental Experts, Draft Convention on Substantive Rules
Regarding Intermediated Securities, Third Session Rome, Study LXXVIII Doc. 57, (November 2006)
("UNIDROIT").
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investors maintain accounts with intermediaries, 3 ' such as investment
brokers or banks, and purchase securities through them. Both brokers and
banks generally hold securities through other intermediaries which utilize
central securities depositories to take possession of share certificates. 3 '
The growth of shares held through intermediaries is the result of the
market's internationalization and demonstrates the deficiencies of applying
domestic laws to transactions typically involving multiple jurisdictions.
The development of uniform rules governing securities held through
intermediaries is extremely important to enhancing legal certainty and
market efficiency. These holdings are often used as security to creditors
and it is essential that the law governing these pledges is clearly
ascertainable to ensure they are effective in the relevant legal jurisdiction.
The Hague "Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in
Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary" concluded July 5,
2006,132 and attempted to develop a legally binding international instrument
to regulate a portion of the capital market. The preamble of the agreement
states the convention's purpose as follows:
Aware of the urgent practical need in a large and growing global financial
market to provide legal certainty and predictability as to the law
applicable to securities that are now commonly held through clearing and
settlement systems or other intermediaries. 1
33
The convention created a set of conflict rules to govern transactions
known as the "agreement plus reality test," designed to provide consistency
in the application of conflict of laws rules dealing with securities held
through intermediaries.
According to the test, "the law governing a transaction effected on the
books of an intermediary is, in general, determined by the relationship
between the investor and intermediary."' 134 The notion of allowing parties
unrestricted selection of governing law was mentioned but did not attract
sufficient levels of support. 35 Instead the convention gives precedence to
the law selected by the intermediary and customer as long as it meets
certain criteria. 36 Under this approach an agreement specifying the
governing law is effective so long as the jurisdiction bears a sufficient
connection to the activities of the intermediary.3 3 The formulation of this
130. An intermediary is defined as "a person that in the course of business or other regular activity
maintains securities accounts for others..." Hague Convention, supra note 134, Article 1.
131 James S. Rogers, Conflict of Laws for Transactions in Securities Held Through Intermediaries,
39 Cornell Int'l L.J. 285, 286 (2006) ("Rogers").
132. Hague Convention, Supra note 128.
133. Id., Preamble.
134. Rogers, Supra note 131, at 286.
135. Id. at 308.
136. Id at 288.
137. Id. at 308. The convention has expressly dismissed the approach which is currently in
operation for directly held securities. Article 6 of the Convention explains that the place of
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rule came as a compromise between differing legal regimes and replaces
the traditional conflict of law rules which rely on place of incorporation, or
location of share certificates, to determine applicable law.
Although agreement was reached between the drafters of the
convention, it can not be considered a true victory for international
convergence in securities law. The subject matter of the convention was
extremely narrow and did not affect the scope of domestic regulatory
jurisdiction of securities, and the activities of intermediaries clearly remain
within the ambit of domestic authorities. 13 8 Furthermore, it did not impose
obligations on national securities regimes or require any substantive
changes of law. Essentially the convention's aim was to provide one
uniform rule that could be applied to securities pledged through
intermediaries in order to reduce agency costs and improve legal certainty.
The substance of the convention does not provide material advantage to
any nation and therefore, on the surface, competing national interests
should not have played a role in the treaties negotiations. Nonetheless, at
this point it has failed to be widely adopted and this highlights the immense
difficulties of reaching international consensus in securities coordination.
Currently, the treaty bears the signatures of Switzerland and the United
States alone.'39
The Hague Convention is a starting point and its significance lies in
the fact that it is potentially the first legally binding multi-lateral treaty to
govern the securities market. At this stage it is equally plausible the treaty
represents a global will to regulate the securities industry or a global
reluctance to commence such effort. The adoption of the "agreement plus
reality" test demonstrates a movement towards giving deference to freedom
of contract and represents an emerging international norm of significance
to the securities industry. However, the Hague Convention does little to
protect investors or ensure accountability of intermediaries operating on the
international plane. At best the treaty represents a movement towards
greater coordination in the regulation of capital markets.
The progress of the Hague Convention demonstrates that treaty
making is becoming obstructed by politics particularly within the EU
where achieving consensus is increasingly elusive. 4' The success or
incorporation of the issuer of shares, and the location of the register are both factors which are to be
disregarded in analyzing the law to be applied. However, the convention includes a set of fall back
rules in the event that the agreement between the parties does not select the applicable law to govern the
contract. In this case Article 5(2) holds that the applicable law will be determined by the
intermediaries' place of incorporation.
138. Id. at 317.
139. As of August 2007, see the Hague Convention Website for updated list of signatories available
at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index-en.php?act=-conventions.text&cid=72.
140. It has been suggested by insiders that decisions regarding ratification of treaties within the EU
often are made based on considerations which have little to do with the substance of a convention.
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failure of the Hague Convention will shed light on whether
intergovernmental treaties are a viable means to create a securities
framework.
B. The UNIDROIT Proposed Convention on Substantive Law
The first major inter-governmental attempt at developing a substantive
international securities framework is currently being developed by
UNIDROIT. Their proposed convention on "Substantive Rules Regarding
Intermediated Securities" represents an international effort to harmonize
the global capital market.' 4 ' Whereas the Hague Convention focused on
conflict of law rules, UNIDROIT's initiative aims to create uniform
operational rules to govern intermediated securities.' According to the
convention's drafters the aims of international securities initiatives should
be: the protection of market participants, such as investors, collateral takers
and intermediaries; the protection of the financial system in the event of
major institutional failure; and gains in economic efficiency. 43 However, as
the project has taken shape the emphasis has been placed on facilitating
investment and efficiency, while overall market and investor protection has
taken a back seat. The primary focus has been restricted to promoting legal
certainty in international transactions and this demonstrates the lack of
international will to target the true dangers of the market.
The project arose from the recognition that applying domestic rules to
the international securities market is not an efficient regulation of global
investment. While the Hague Convention and traditional private
international law aim to provide uniform rules identifying the appropriate
domestic law to apply to securities, this law may not be effective in
governing international securities transactions. National laws vary greatly
in substance and quality and this represents a drag on certainty and
efficiency. The UNIDROIT study group identifies two principles which
the convention's substantive rules should address. First, rules governing
cross-border securities must be internally sound.'44 In order for this to be
achieved all applicable national laws must be clear and justified. Second,
these rules must be compatible with the international market.'45 Even when
141. UNIDROIT, supra note 129.
142. The Convention is intended to apply where conflict of law rules designate the law of a
contracting state as applicable law or where the applicable law is that of a contracting state without
reference to conflict of law principles. UNIDROIT, supra note 135, at Article 2.
143. Phillip Paech, Legal Risk and Market Efficiency, in LJNIDROIT Seminar on Harmonized
Substantive Rule Regarding Securities Held With an Intermediary 1(2004) ("Paech")
144. UNIDROIT Study Group, Seminar on Harmonized Substantive Rule Regarding Securities
Held with an Intermediary, (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications
/review/articles at 5 ("Position Paper").
145. Id.
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all nations possess sound rules it is possible that these systems may
conflict, creating market inefficiencies. The project's objective is to
encourage uniformity and convergence by ensuring only rational and
compatible rules are applied to securities held through intermediaries.
The founders of the UNIDROIT project believed it could be a forum
in which to develop a comprehensive global regime for securities
regulation. At its conception this project was guided by the lofty goal of
creating unified investor rights.146 However, political differences quickly
rendered this unachievable. It was argued that other related areas such as
tax, insolvency and corporate law were too domestically entrenched to
permit global securities harmonization."' The result of this political
opposition was a severe curtailing of the initiative's scope, with the
adoption of the functional approach advocating unification only where
"absolutely necessary."'4 8 Clearly, this illustrates a lack of international
will to develop a functioning substantive framework. As a result, it is
likely that the convention will comprise a set of mandatory baseline rules,
as well as an optional annex with a more ambitious set of harmonized
rules. 4 9 The initial vision of sweeping harmonization has now been
reduced to a set of nine issues which largely aim to improve market
efficiency. 5 ' The UNIDROIT project now focuses on achieving legal
certainty but does not impose any obligations on intermediaries such as
creating disclosure standards or prohibiting unethical behaviors.
The limited agenda of the UNIDROIT initiative demonstrates the
continued reluctance of the global community to achieve meaningful
convergence in securities regulation. The subject matter of the proposed
convention lends more to the facilitation of cross border investment than to
its regulation. As this initiative is in the beginning stages if, when, or how
it will affect the international capital market is a mystery. However, if the
current track record of international securities initiatives is any indication,
it will not be any time in the near future.
146. B. Sen, B, Enhancing Legal Certainty over Investment Securities Held with an Intermediary,
Unif. L. Review 2005-1/2 6 (2005).
147. Id.
148. Paech supra note 143, at 2.
149. Position Paper; supra note 144, at 14.
150. Id., The Scope of the proposed Convention includes the following: 1) Recognition of book
entries as only condition for a disposition 2) Role of Uniform Dispositions 3) Clear and simple rule for
creation and realization of collateral 4) Good faith acquisition 5) Net settlement 6) Finality and
irrevocability 7) Possibility of provisional credits 8) Loss allocation 9) Preclusion of Upper Tier
Attachment.
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C. Outlook
Government initiatives to develop international laws governing the
securities industry have failed to produce any meaningful results. Although
there are significant obstacles to the convergence of international securities
laws, the realities of the global capital market make it essential.
Administrative problems at domestic levels are no excuse for maintaining
an ineffective system of regulation and market discipline. Capital markets
will continue to lose their domestic character and the current system of
regulation will become less and less effective. The global community
should not wait for a market failure to take action.
The current initiatives we have discussed are limited in nature and will
do little to address the systemic problems facing the global capital market.
Essentially the international community is reluctant to take actions which
may constrain capital markets despite the fact that this is precisely what is
needed.
The Hague Convention and UNIDROIT demonstrate the infantile
state of the international securities regime. They also raise serious
questions regarding the viability of relying on bureaucrats to develop a
legal framework through treaty agreements. However, history has
demonstrated that such a feat is possible, and agencies like the WTO and
IMF have been instrumental to the international economy. The need for
international oversight may be better met by the development of an
international agency with regulatory powers. Although this would require a
sacrifice of sovereignty, it is perhaps the only way in which true
achievements can be made.
II. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DOMESTIC REGULATORS
Whereas international consensus at the governmental level is rarely
achieved, domestic regulators have been successful in making some
important steps towards harmonizing the investment industry. While these
initiatives have been effectively negotiated, they lack the legal power of an
international treaty. As a result they have had varying success in their
implementation, and currently serve more as recommended standards than
binding legal instruments. This section examines the International
Organization of Securities Commissions and Similar Organizations
(IOSCO) and its development of uniform disclosure standards and the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) regulation of the financial
industry. Both organizations have important implications for the protection
of investors and the health of the capital market. They have achieved legal
status within specific domestic regimes and compliance with their
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standards is a key signal of transparency and accountability within private
industry and both. Furthermore, these organizations have the potential to
create uniform international policies which could form a basis or model for
regulation of the capital market.
A. The IOSCO
The IOSCO is composed of one hundred and ten national securities
regulators.'51 It was once described as the most important organization
attempting to influence international securities regulation.'52 This has
proven to be somewhat of a dubious distinction in light of the failures of
international regulation. The IOSCO does not possess binding authority
over its members and consensus within the organization is often obscure. 3
Nonetheless, the IOSCO has made advancements in the field of securities
disclosure and has the potential to serve as a model for convergence of
international standards.
The IOSCO proposed the development of a single disclosure
document in multi jurisdictional offerings through the harmonization of
global disclosure standards. The commission also urged the creation of
international accounting and auditing standards upon which such disclosure
could be based.'54 Foreign issuers who comply with this standard would
have an "international passport" allowing them access to the domestic
securities exchanges of other members. These uniform standards have
received international support and were incorporated into the national laws
of some member countries. In September of 1999 the U.S. SEC
incorporated the IOSCO standards into domestic law.'55
As with most international securities initiatives, the IOSCO disclosure
standards for multi jurisdictional offerings are limited, and only cross
border offerings by foreign issuers fall within their scope.'56 Nonetheless,
it could represent an excellent opportunity to improve general capital
market disclosure. As we have discussed, the reduction of regulatory
requirements can be a tool used by national governments to attract issuers
looking to avoid the burdens of complying with rigorous disclosure
standards. A uniform international standard could prevent this race to the
15 1. For a list please see IOSCO website available at: http://www.iosco.org/.
152. Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, International Organizations and Processes.





156. Final Communique of the 23rd Annual Conference of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions, (Sept. 18, 1998), http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20031016/01r.pdf.
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bottom. Disclosure is perhaps the most effective protector of investors and
the coordinated effort of international regulators should impose high
standards on the issuers of securities and the investment industry. This
would improve the dissemination of information to investors and help
prevent fraud and other market manipulations.
If uniform disclosure was combined with international accounting
standards it would create an efficient system where issuers of securities
worldwide could be measured according to objective standards. Such
uniformity would greatly improve the transparency of the international
capital market. The International Accounting Standards Board.57 has
developed a model set of financial reporting rules for the global market
known as the International Financial Reporting Standards.'58 Convergence
in international accounting standards will make the interpretation of
financial statements easier and improve the effectiveness of disclosure.
The creation of uniform disclosure and accounting standards could
address one of the most significant weaknesses of the capital market, which
is the lack of transparency and imbalance of information. It is vital that
disclosure standards are applied to all financial instruments, including those
marketed to sophisticated investors. As with all international instruments
we have encountered these standards are non-binding, however they do
influence the policy of a substantial number of nations.'59
B. The Bank for International Settlements
The Bank for International Settlements is an organization currently
composed of fifty-five central banks.160 It has played an important role in
devising framework rules to govern the banking industry that are highly
relevant to the international securities market. The "International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards - A Revised
Framework,' 6' or "Basel II," is an effort of international banking
regulators to establish uniform rules for financial institutions. Basel II has
had an important impact on the international finance industry and was
recently incorporated into EU law.
162
157. For more information see the International Accounting Standards Board website available at
http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm.
158. Formerly known as the International Accounting Standards (LAS).
159. According to the IASB website nearly 100 countries currently require or permit the use of, or
have a policy of convergence with, IFRSs.
160. Please see Bank for International Settlements website avail at www.bis.org.
161. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, A Revised Framework Comprehensive, (Version 2004, Updated
2006) www.bis.org ("Basel I1").
162. Council Directive 2006/49/EC (LI 77/2001) (EN), on the capital adequacy of investmentfirms
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The Basel committee developed a framework to build stability in the
international banking system by regulating risk management practices of
financial institutions. The most significant and well known measure is the
general requirement that banks hold the capital equivalent to 8% of their
risk weighted assets. 6 ' This requirement was agreed to in the first Basel
Accord; however, Basel II has sought to adopt a more sophisticated
approach in determining the risk weight of assets which allows two
methods of calculating regulatory capital required for credit risk. The first
technique known as the "standardized approach" is reliant upon external
credit rating agencies to determine the risks associated with a financial
institution's holdings. For these ratings to be accepted they must be from
agencies recognized by domestic banking regulators."64 The second
method, known as the "internal ratings based approach," allows financial
institutions to develop their own internal rating system based on certain
guidelines."'
Basel II also increases transparency through supervisory review giving
regulators greater means of inspection and access to information. This is
known as the "second pillar", and requires high standards of disclosure by
financial institutions to ensure market participants have an accurate picture
of risk levels. The international acceptance of the Basel standards is an
important step towards ensuring market stability and preventing
disruptions.
An unfortunate limitation of the accord is that it is not law but rather a
model which has been described by the Basel Committee as "being
circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide with a view to encouraging
them to consider adopting this revised Framework at such time as they
believe is consistent with their broader supervisory priorities.' 66 The lack
of legal force behind Basel and Basel II has lead to varied implementation
of the initiatives. 167 Nonetheless, Basel II has direct implications on the
international debt market as it creates a global standard and acts as an
oversight agency. Its success demonstrates that domestic regulators can
and credit institutions (recast) (June 14, 2006).
163. Basel II, supra note 161, at para 40.
164. As we shall see in the following section, credit agencies have not been effective or reliable
providers of market information. Therefore, it is highly problematic to allow these ratings to determine
the capital requirements of the finance industry.
165. Patrick Van Roy, Credit ratings and the standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II, in
European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics, No. 519, (August 2005),
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp5I7.pdf.
166. Basel I1, supra note 161, at Article 3.
167. As mentioned the EU has adopted the Basel I1 requirements as law. However, the Basel
requirements have also been manipulated. Please see Dan W. Puchnmak, Perverse Main Bank Rescue in
the Lost Decade- Proof that Unique Institutional Incentives Drive Japanese Corporate Governance,
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, V.16, no. 2 39 (March 2007), for an example of the regulatory
avoidance of the Basel Accord in Japan.
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achieve consensus at an international level.
Although the major objective of the Basel Committee is to improve
global financial stability, the Basel Accord also contributed to the growth
of securitization, which, as discussed previously, can lead to economic
dangers. Compliance with Basel II's minimum capital requirements has
encouraged financial institutions to decrease their risk exposures. Under
Basel II the holding of assets with attached risks, such as mortgages,
requires banks to maintain certain levels of capital to ensure financial
stability if those assets fail to materialize (if a mortgagee defaults on loans
payments). Securitization of debt allows banks to transfer risk to third
parties by converting risk-bearing assets into cash. By selling this risk
banks can comply with Basel II more easily.168 However, this detachment
of risk can lead to reckless behavior on the part of financial institutions.
This can be particularly dangerous if the risks associated with these assets
are disguised.
Although Basel II should improve the stability of the finance industry,
it does not deal with the economic risks which are transferred to investors.
It is essential to recognize that risks do not disappear and if they
accumulate in other unregulated sectors of the market its stability may be at
risk. This is a hazard of the current patchwork approach; although the
banking system may be insulated from the risks it creates, these risks do
not vanish but are rather transferred to other sectors of the market.
C. Outlook
Agreements between national regulators have been more successful
than governmental initiatives largely because as they have less force they
are not as politicized. The IOSCO and the Basel Committee have helped
improve the transparency and accountability of the market. However, these
agreements do not fully achieve their respective goals because of the many
gaps in international capital market regulation. Market risks, such as the
demise of the U.S. sub-prime market, were hidden from regulators and
investors until it was too late. This was because disclosure of information
regarding MBS was insufficient. If we consider the application of the
Basel Minimum Capital requirements, financial institutions heavily
involved in the market were able to achieve compliance by transferring
risks to unwitting investors. The complexity of the capital market prevents
regulators and investors from comprehending the true value of securities
and until this is remedied through better disclosure of information,
standards can easily be avoided.
168. Glukhovsky, supra note 1, at 655.
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III. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
In absence of effective global regulation of capital markets, private
credit rating agencies play a vital role in overseeing the flow of global
capital. Their importance to the operation of the international capital
market dwarfs that of any international regulatory initiative. These
agencies are integral to the global debt market as a source of information
and market transparency.'69 Their valuation of securities, manifested in the
ratings they assign, have a tremendous impact on trading prices as well as
market confidence. Investors worldwide rely on these ratings to make
financial decisions, as they provide some of the only information available
regarding market instruments, particularly those related to securitization.
They act as market incentives to ensure industry performance by signaling
investors as to the value of a given investment.
A. The Importance of Credit Ratings
The importance of credit ratings to the debt market cannot be overstated
and many factors give them overwhelming power and control over the
investment industry. Far from being restricted to providing information to
investors, ratings can in fact compel investors to act. Ratings assigned by these
agencies can influence the behavior of investors and financial institutions
because they effectively determine what constitutes an investment grade
security. There are credit rating benchmarks for certain market investors,
which prohibit investment in securities that do not meet the standard. 7° For
example, institutional investors such as pension funds are often prohibited
from holding securities that do not achieve minimum rating scores. Therefore,
if an investment holding of a pension fund is downgraded below the minimum
credit rating it must be sold. Conversely, these investors may continue to hold
deteriorating assets provided they have not been downgraded.'' Therefore,
credit ratings can be more influential than the actual value of a security in
determining the behavior of institutional investors.
Similarly, insurance companies are huge investors whose investment
behavior is reliant upon credit ratings. Insurance regulators use credit
ratings to evaluate and influence the holdings of these companies.
169. According to Moody's president the company tracks more than $30 trillion of debt issued in
domestic and international markets. Please see Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
109th Cong 1-2 (Statement of Raymond W. McDaniel) (2005) avail at http://banking/senate.gov.
170. Brian Carroll, Enron Scandal Spurs Proposed Credit Rating Legislation, The Legal
Intelligencer (September 28, 2005), avail at http://law.com.
171. Rosner, supra note 13, at 64.
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American insurance companies are regulated by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) who monitors the credit quality and
value of insurers' investments.'72 The NAIC discourages holdings of
riskier investments by attaching high capital charges to non-investment
grade holdings. This makes it more expensive to hold riskier investments
and it is the evaluation by the rating agency which determines that cost.
At the international level ratings are used by the Basel Committee to
determine the financial position of banking institutions. Under the
"standard approach" Basel II relies on credit ratings to determine financial
institutions' minimum capital requirements.'73 The only assurance of the
integrity of ratings is that they are from a credit rating agency accepted by
national regulators where it is based.'74 As a result, credit ratings are relied
upon to determine the capital requirements of international financial
institutions worldwide.
Perhaps the most vital role played by credit agencies is within the
derivatives market. In our earlier discussion of credit default swaps, we
noted that pre-identified credit events determine whether a protection buyer
is entitled to collect payment from the seller of credit risk protection.
Credit downgrades are often what triggers payment in a credit default
swap. Therefore, the implication of a change in credit rating can be
increased exponentially through the derivatives market. Derivatives are
often misunderstood instruments that do not provide investors with
sufficient information regarding the credit quality of the underlying
borrowers. Credit rating agencies are one of the few sources of information
regarding this enormous and potentially volatile market. The IOSCO has
expressed concern with derivatives explaining, "Because of the opacity and
complexity of these debt instruments, investors such as pension schemes
are more dependent on guidance from rating agencies."' 75 Unfortunately, it
is becoming increasingly evident that credit ratings agencies have provided
misinformation regarding the value of securitized assets and derivatives.
B. Failures of the Rating Industry
The extraordinarily important role assumed by credit ratings creates an
expectation that only the highest levels of quality and integrity will be
acceptable from the agencies, which provide these ratings. However, the
credit rating industry is failing to remedy information imbalances between
debt issuers and investors and there is growing consensus that the ratings
172. Partnoy, supra note 44, at 700.
173. Basel 11, supra note 16, at para 50.
174. Id
175. Rosner, supra note 13, at 31.
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provided by these agencies are of little informational value.176 The world's
most influential credit agencies failed to predict the largest bankruptcy in
U.S. history, rating Enron as investment grade until four days before it filed
for bankruptcy. They were also unaware of the imminent collapse of the
massive American dotcom company, WorldCom, until forty-two days
before it filed for bankruptcy.' Furthermore, on October 30, 2006, Fitch
ratings a globally recognized agency increased the rating of New Century
Financial, a now defunct mortgage lender, commending the firm for its
"competent management team, established servicing platform, capable
default technology, and enhanced cross-functional training platform."' 78
These monumental failings are indicative of the poor health of the ratings
industry and demonstrate that they are more reactive than predictive.' 79
There is a growing concern that the entire rating industry suffers from
inherent conflicts of interest and has failed to provide the global market
with accurate information and ratings analysis. This is a cause for serious
concern in light of the power and influence they hold.
The ratings industry is dominated by a small number of firms, giving
them tremendous power in the international market. In the U.S. and
internationally, three agencies, Moody's, S&P and Fitch, dominate the
ratings market. 8 ° This is largely attributable to their statutory monopoly
granted by the government as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations (NRSROs).'' Protected by this state sanctioned monopoly
they have made billions in profits, however, the integrity of the information
they provide is highly suspect. Allowing a small number of private firms
to oversee the operation of the international market combined with the
nature of the ratings industry gives rise to inherent conflicts of interest.
Rating agencies receive the majority of their income from the corporations
they rate,'82 raising obvious questions regarding their motivations.
Furthermore, as discussed, certain investors are limited to holding
investment grade securities and therefore a rating change can force them to
sell at a disadvantageous time. There is speculation that rating agencies will
inflate ratings for a fee, granting investment grade status, allowing
investors to circumvent quality restriction, and purchase or hold more risky
176. Please see Partnoy, supra note 44, Rosner, supra note 13.
177. Credit Rating Duopoly Relief Act of 2006, 109th Congress 2d Session 109-546.11, (2006)
(report of Representative Michael Oxley).
178. Rosner, supra note 13, at 27.
179. Legislative Solutions for the Rating Agency Duopoly: Hearing before, the Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, (June 29, 2005)(Testimony of
Frank Partnoy).
180. Only Moody's, S&P and Fitch are recognized by all of the member countries of the Basel
Committee.
181. Fitch rating is also a NRSRO but does not have the same market share.
182. Partnoy, supra note 44, at 652.
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investments.'83 Agencies have been accused of inflating ratings for issuers
in return for the payment of higher premiums.'84 These conflicts of interest
expose the innate problems of allowing private industry to act as
gatekeeper of the securities market. It also raises doubts regarding the
integrity of the information provided by these agencies.
The failure of rating agencies to provide accurate information played
an important role in perpetuating the U.S. housing bubble. Their
assignment of artificially high ratings to secondary market instruments
contributed to the influx of investment and mispricing of these assets.
Furthermore, the importance of ratings increases with more complicated
structures such as CDOs, as less information is available and their value is
more difficult to determine. A major difficulty with interpreting ratings is
that they are often as opaque as the derivatives market itself. Recent
studies have determined that the methodologies used are flawed and attach
ratings, which are higher than the sum of the parts' 85It is argued that the
traditional credit risk models used by credit rating firms are unsuitable for
MBS because the servicing and payment obligations are continuously
changing.'86 As it becomes increasingly clear that rating agencies have
overvalued MBS, it is likely they will be forced to implement widespread
ratings downgrades' 87 This could in turn force institutional investors to
sell their holdings exacerbating the situation.
U.S. rating agencies enjoy tremendous market power with their ratings
determining market behavior at many levels. However, the U.S. judiciary has
failed to recognize their de facto regulatory power within the market, equating
their ratings to mere opinions. The leading global rating agencies have been
immune from liability for issuing negligent, false, or misleading ratings.
Judicial treatment of NRSROs has equated them to journalists, offering them
first amendment protection as free speech. 88 This is clearly an erroneous
analogy because of the market's overwhelming reliance on their ratings. The
U.S. Senate Commerce Committee describes the issue as follows:
The credit rating agencies seem to be trying to walk a fine line between
maintaining their enormous market power through both official and
unofficial uses of their ratings, and insisting their ratings are purely their
183. Id
184. Id. at 701.
185. Partnoy, supra note 44, at 667.
186. Rosner, supra note 13, at 47.
187. MBS rating downgrades have begun with Moody's downgrade of $5.2 billion of MBS on July
10, 2007. It is likely that this is the tip of the iceberg. A recent S&P report stated that changes "will be
implemented with respect to the methodology for rating new transactions" involving CDOs Please see
Barnes, supra note 78.
188. Jefferson County School District No. R-I v. Moody's Investor Services Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859
(1999 10th circuit).
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"opinion," and therefore pure speech under a First Amendment analysis.189
Judicial characterization of NRSROs as mere opinion providers is
naive and significantly reduces accountability within the industry.
U.S. legislators aware of the failings of this industry have passed a bill
that may fundamentally change its nature. The Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006,190 targets the credit rating industry and will open it to
competition as well as introduce more transparency and accountability.
The bill empowers the SEC to require rating agencies to maintain books
and records, conduct examinations, and initiate enforcement against credit
raters. This legislation should significantly improve the industry's
operation. However, it may also force a re-evaluation of securitized assets,
the results of which may not be welcome news.
The most recent IMF Global Financial Stability Report warns that one
of the greatest risks to the international economy is: "rating agencies
continue to expand the application of their ratings beyond the traditional
credit risk domain."'19' However, rating agencies are allowed, if not
encouraged, to extend their influence because of the lack of regulation and
transparency in the international capital market. Although it is apparent
that credit raters are failing to provide reliable information, it is equally
evident that they are a vital and irreplaceable component of the
international investment infrastructure. The need to establish an
international organization to regulate and evaluate capital markets has
never been so imperative.
IV. FREEDOM OF PARTIES
The ineffectiveness and uncertainties of the international securities
framework has inspired a market response whereby private parties use
contractual agreements to specify choice of law and venue. This important
provides an alternative to reliance on the domestic approach to securities
law and is a means of gaining predictability in choice of law issues. The
principle of freedom of contract and rise of international commercial
arbitration represent a market solution to the lack of international
regulation.
National courts recognize the importance of allowing parties the
freedom to determine the laws and jurisdiction that will govern their
relationship. The United States Supreme Court, a traditionally vigilant
189. Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs Report of the Staff to
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 123, (October 8, 2002), http://www.senate.gov/-govt-
aff/100702watchdogsreport.pdf.
190. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, S. 3850 109th Congress (January 3, 2006).
191. IMF, Global Financial Stability Report 54 (Apr. 2007).
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defender of domestic jurisdiction, recognizes the growing international tend
towards party autonomy. In Bremen, the Supreme Court explained the
importance of freedom of contract to international business transactions.
Justice Stewart ruled that:
A contractual provision specifying in Advance the forum in which a
dispute shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and
predictability essential to any business transaction.'
The Supreme Court in Scherk also explained that parties of
international securities transactions are free to choose the law they see
fit.'93 The supremacy of freedom of contract is becoming an international
norm.'94 This principle is an important step in gleaning some certainty in
this borderless industry, as it allows parties to choose arbitration over
court. '
Private party agreements can enhance predictability and fill gaps in
the international securities framework. Although contractual agreements
regarding securities transactions have been focused on establishing
jurisdiction and choice of law for disputes, they also represent an
opportunity to regulate issuer behavior. Contractual terms which define
misrepresentation, and specifies recourse in such case, could be an
effective means of improving the accountability of the investment industry.
Institutional investors have the market power to demand conditions when
dealing with the investment industry. As discussed, these investors
invested heavily in the U.S. MBS market and the decline of this market
should alert them to the risks of an unregulated market which lacks
transparency.
V. THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION
International initiatives aimed to provide a comprehensive framework
for regulating the global capital market are at a juvenile stage of
development. The consequence of lack of regulation and oversight is that
individual domestic regimes remain charged with governing activity
outside their borders. As most domestic securities laws were designed in a
different era it is unrealistic to expect them to effectively adapt to a
192. MIS Bremen and Unterweser Reederei Gmbh v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct.
(1972), the case was cited extensively in the recent decision of Richards v Lloyds of London, 135 F.3d
1289 (9th Circ 1998).
193. Scherk vAlberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 516, (1974).
194. See for example Article 3 of the Convention of Rome on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 80/934/EEC (June 19, 1980).
195. See for example Hong-Lin You, From Arbitrability to A-National Principles - The US
Experience, Int. A.L.R. 1999, 2(1), 1-8, (1999).
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financial landscape designed by sophisticated practitioners who exploit
opportunities of the global market. This current patchwork approach does
not effectively close the gaps between regulatory regimes and often misses
the bigger picture; capital markets are not confined within domestic
borders. This model has been outgrown and the current approach neglects
the larger global implications of international debt flows. This has allowed
financial institutions such as investment banks to operate unhindered on the
global scale. The result is a proliferation of new financial instruments and
markets. These developments have not been accompanied by regulatory
advances and endanger international investors and the global economy.
The private sector is beginning to seek alternatives to the traditional
systems of securities regulation and dispute resolution and this
development has the potential to play an important role in securities
markets. Furthermore, coordinated efforts by domestic regulators,
particularly in the field of disclosure, represents a vital means of providing
protection to investors and the overall market. However, in order to
achieve a truly sustainable framework to govern global capital markets, an
organization of governments should form to oversee and regulate
international debt flows. The potential of these mechanisms to improve the
international debt market will be explored in this final section.
A. Contractual Agreements
Private contractual relationships will play an important role in lieu of
effective international regulation in establishing the rights and duties
attached to investment relationships. International commercial arbitration
is now a well accepted alternative in dealing with disputes arising out of
securities transactions. The growing recognition of the validity of
arbitration and choice of law agreements make private contracts an
attractive alternative to the current domestic framework.'96 The benefits of
arbitration include increased legal certainty and the confidential nature of
proceedings. Another major advantage is that arbitrators specializing in
international securities disputes can be utilized.
Although these attempts by private parties will not remedy broad
economic dangers, they do provide potential for improving investor
protection. Not only do arbitration and choice of law agreements improve
legal predictability, they could also stimulate higher standards within the
investment industry. This is particularly applicable to "sophisticated"
investors who are inclined to opt for arbitration rather than publicize their
196. A prime example is London, England, a center for global securities arbitration, which is well
equipped to handle complex, multiparty disputes arising from securities deals. For more information
please see the London Court of International Arbitration website at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/.
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investment failings through litigation. Large scale investors often do not
share in the protections afforded to individual investors because they are
believed to have the skills and resources to fend for themselves. Within
this unregulated market there is an opportunity for these powerful investors
to contractually oblige investment firms to raise disclosure standards.
Furthermore, standards of negligence and misrepresentation could be
contractually agreed upon between parties.
There is a great deal of information failure in the international capital
market. Within the U.S. MBS industry it is likely that institutional
investors were mislead by securitizers and rating agencies with regards to
the underlying value of their investments. Through contractual agreements
a number of measures could be introduced to avoid this situation. First,
issuers could be obligated to provide complete and continuous disclosure of
the assets underlying their securities. Second, contractually agreed
performance requirements could be introduced. Investments by their
nature are speculative and include risk. However, it would not be
unreasonable to demand minimum protections when MBS issuers profit so
greatly. The massive capital held by institutional investors gives them the
leverage to demand disclosure and results. This would improve the
incentive structure within the investment industry.
The rise of international commercial arbitration allows parties to
circumvent the limitations of domestic systems ill-suited to international
capital markets. However, private contracts not subject to state scrutiny are
susceptible to power and information imbalances. Arbitration is not a
viable option for the average investor. Using private contracts to regulate
international capital relationships will only protect powerful investors and
does little to remedy market vulnerability as a whole.
B. Uniform Global Disclosure Standards
There is a direct correlation between levels of information held by
participants and the successful operation of the market. Unfortunately,
information failures are responsible for market distortions and investor
losses all too often. As we have seen, information provided by the
investment industry through investment banks, credit rating agencies, and
other institutions is often flawed if not downright negligent. Financial
regulators are unable to effectively monitor secondary markets where only
"qualified investors" have access to performance reports and other
information regarding these financial instruments.'97 Shockingly, U.S.
banking regulators are not considered to be "qualified investors" and even
197. Rosner, supra note 13, at 83.
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after designation must receive permission to inspect securities prospectuses
and deal information.'98 The opacity and complexity of securitization and
derivative instruments leaves a select few with a virtual monopoly of
information.
The failure of the U.S. MBS market is an example of how information
deficiencies create artificial economies and perpetuate malfeasance. Sub-
prime loans were an important part of the U.S. MBS market rise, with loan
packages attracting a great deal of investment worldwide. Investors clearly
did not understand the risks involved primarily because of the complex
structures, which packaged sub-prime loans with reliable mortgages and
understated the aggregate risks. Furthermore, CDO structures were
designed and marketed as instruments insulated from risk through
derivatives such as credit default swaps. With mortgage defaults now
sweeping the U.S. it is clear that these instruments are not the safe
investments they were represented to be. More shocking than these
unethical behaviors is that victims of these improprieties may not even
know they have suffered losses. As widespread losses continue to be
incurred, it is unclear how far and to whom they will affect. There is a
shocking lack of information regarding who holds the risk of mortgage
defaults in the U.S. market. According to one prominent market
researcher, "It's pathetic, but it is almost impossible to find out, which is no
good for the system or anyone really .... On the CDO side we know even
less and regulators know even less because there aren't even clear reporting
standards."' 99 There are concerns that unsuspecting holders like pension
funds may have significant exposure. Clearly there are severe problems
with the flow of information within the capital market. As the complexity
and range of financial instruments continue to expand, something must be
done to remedy this.
An inherent difficulty with the global capital market is that
information is a commodity and imbalances are exploited for profit. The
failure of the U.S. sub-prime market did not take everyone by surprise and
it has been reported that many hedge funds made significant gains from the
collapse through options markets.2 °° It would not be surprising to discover
that the same firms singing the praises of higher yields through the MBS
market were shorting these securities. Lack of disclosure is a catalyst for
malfeasance and can lead to market failures. Currently, issuers can easily
avoid disclosure obligations by choosing lenient jurisdictions or operating
198. Id.
199. There is speculation from experts that Asian and especially Japanese investors have been
hardest hit. Alistar Barr, Mortgage Crisis to hit holders of risky derivatives, (April 2, 2007) Market
Watch, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/whos-winning-lose-subprime-shakeout/story.
aspx?guid=%7B20967453-D958-4D99-B40B-59COE80FC036%7D, quoting Josh Rosner a managing
director of the research firm Graham Fisher & Co.
200. Id.
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in unregulated sectors. The international community cannot afford to wait
to improve the flow and quality of information in the capital market. The
MBS market is but one example of a continuous cycle of information
failures and as the derivatives market continues to expand the stakes have
become very high.
Transparency needs to be improved in the market and coordinated
efforts at the international level must be undertaken. The implementation
of rigid global disclosure standards is of extreme importance to improving
regulation, investor protection, and ensuring stability of the overall market.
These standards would lead to far greater market transparency and could
prevent the large scale abuses which characterize today's market.
The IOSCO has been relatively successful in proposing uniform
standards and in the short term could be a forum for reaching international
agreement on disclosure and accounting by facilitating convergence
between domestic regulators. However, the IOSCO may lack the power of
compulsion necessary to achieve meaningful reform. Unless incorporated
into domestic law IOSCO standards act more as a guide then a source of
law. In order to have meaningful impact disclosure must have the force of
law either at the domestic or international level.
There are also two major shortcomings which detract from the
effective flow of market information. First, the current system of
disclosure is overly reliant on rating agencies without providing sufficient
oversight or constraints upon the industry. Rating agencies must be made
more accountable. The U.S. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act is an
important step to improving the operation of the credit industry and
reducing information imbalances. However, in order to be successful the
oversight powers granted to the SEC must be vigilantly applied and U.S.
courts must develop a more rational understanding of the role of rating
agencies. Second, it is crucial that disclosure standards are extended to the
derivatives market and to investments offered to sophisticated investors.
The derivatives market currently allows securities to be valued at the whim
of private industry with only credit rating agencies providing information.
Transparency reforms should include publicized performance reports and
creating rules and regulations for structured securities. Improving
disclosure with regards to securitized assets and derivatives will create a
more economically sound capital market allowing investors to accurately
price investments. Furthermore, it is essential that disclosure standards are
applied to transactions involving sophisticated investors and that they
register their investments. Sophisticated investors are often representatives
of large groups who should be aware of their investments. There is no
justification for allowing these transactions to occur behind closed doors.
The key to a successful global capital market is widespread
knowledge and information. The current system is unacceptable and poses
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dangers to the international economy. We must not wait for a system
failure to begin analyzing the shortcomings and dangers which currently
exist. Uniform disclosure standards are achievable and could significantly
improve the flow of market information reducing the risk of misfeasance
and market distortions. Initiatives of this nature are currently being
undertaken between national securities regulators. However, eventually
disclosure requirements should be assumed by an international organization
with the power to regulate the global financial system.
C. International Credit Organization
This paper has repeatedly stressed the importance of substantive
intergovernmental action to regulate the global capital market. The market
currently faces huge debt imbalances and holds a large proportion of the
world's wealth in foggy sectors. It is no longer sufficient that each country
is regulated; we must focus on interactions between economies with regard
to savings and investment. Political realities indicate that treaty-making
will not create an effective regulatory framework any time soon. However,
there remains a need for the development of a multi-lateral organization to
set baseline regulations for securities markets and to oversee its operation.
An International Capital Organization (ICO) should be created and
empowered to regulate the investment industry and monitor global debt
flows. Such an organization is the only feasible way to protect global
financial stability in this era of international markets. This organization
should have widespread supervisory and inspection powers over private
industry and enforce uniform disclosure and accounting standards.
Crucially, it must be able to regulate all sectors and members of the
investment industry, including transactions involving sophisticated
investors and the trade of derivatives. It should also monitor and report on
macroeconomic developments and trends of concern to capital market
operation.
World-famous economist Henry Kaufman has proposed the creation
of a world financial regulator composed of investment professionals from
all major industrialized countries.20' Kaufman's proposal would have this
organization provide public credit ratings of financial market participants.
This is a brilliant concept, which could improve information flows and the
current biased nature of credit ratings. The role of credit ratings in the
international capital market is paramount and should not be entrusted to
private firms. Furthermore, bestowing this function on an international
organization would be an excellent way to conquer current political
201. Henry Kaufman, Preventing the Next Global Financial Crisis, WASHINGTON POST, January
28, A17.
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
obstacles to uniform regulation. On the surface this development would
not require the sacrifice of national sovereignty in the way a treaty requires
concrete obligations and adherence to rules. The ICO would not need the
power of legal compulsion to achieve its regulatory goals as market
realities would more than compensate. As discussed, the only meaningful
regulation of securities at the international level is provided by credit
agencies whose ratings determine the ability to attract capital and the cost
of borrowing. While no country would allow their economic policies to be
governed by an international organization, this would allow the ICO to
ensure responsibility and transparency at the national and international
level or face a dreaded credit downgrade. Currently, private rating firms
have assumed a primary position in the international capital market and
though they have profited greatly, they have failed to effectively evaluate
the market. This position and the power it entails should be controlled at
an international level by an ICO. This would be a great achievement in
global regulation and fundamentally improve the operation of capital
markets.
The major obstacle to the development of an ICO will be its inability
to acquire sufficient operational resources. The task of overseeing and
evaluating the global capital market is a monumental one, which requires
international coordination. The organization must attract leading financial
minds to fulfill its mandate and large capital contributions would be
required from nations worldwide. In the short term, these functions could
be undertaken by an organization formed under the auspices of the IMF,
which is already involved in the study of capital markets. However this
may limit the potential of the organization and potentially damage its
perception. Instead, nations of the world should establish a fresh
organization through cooperation and consensus.
International coordination in securities regulation has been
unsuccessful to this point and a great deal of political will and conciliation
will be necessary to accomplish it. However, the fate of the international
economy may depend on such an achievement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The international securities market has flourished, improving global
prosperity but also creating risks for market participants and the global
economy. The traditional conception of capital markets as domestic no
longer reflects the reality of international finance. We have entered an era
in which the lifetime savings of a Japanese grandmother can contribute to
home ownership half a world away. It is clear that regulation of the capital
market has not kept pace with these developments and still retains a
domestic focus. This has been very profitable for the investment industry
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and large importers of capital like the U.S. However, this unregulated
climate is dangerous to parties that lack the information to make informed
investments and the international economy as a whole. The first part of
this paper demonstrated how our first time homebuyer Hiro, and his
grandmother, Kayori, a pension fund contributor could be harmed by the
market. Millions of these debt relationships exist and their cumulative
effects could be dire. Uninformed or misrepresented investments also
distort the market, creating asset bubbles, inefficient allocations of capital
and huge debt imbalances.
The lack of international regulation has not harmed the short-term
interests of developed capital markets. The U.S.'s success in attracting a
disproportionately large sum of international investment is due in part to
the lack of efficient regulation elsewhere in the world. This infusion of
capital reduces borrowing costs and risks and fuels their high levels of
domestic spending. However, it has also created the most indebted nation
in world history, owing around $4.9 trillion." 2 The U.S. debt imbalance
has allowed the country to enjoy consecutive asset bubbles (stock market,
housing) but the time will come when it will have to repay its debts.
The U.S. housing market has been described as the global economic
wildcard and securitization has transferred a significant portion of this risk
to foreign investors. The sub-prime industry is an example of market
distortion perpetuated through securitization. The crash of this market has
damaged the global economy and caused widespread losses to investors.
With the recent failure of American Home Mortgage Investment Corp., and
bankruptcy concerns for Countrywide Financial Corp. the largest U.S.
mortgage lender it is clear that damage is no longer restricted to the sub-
prime industry. 3 It is too early to say how long or severe the economic
slump will be, but it is already taking its toll on the international financial
market.2° If the U.S. housing market is the global economic wild card, the
derivatives market is the joker and could exacerbate the crisis. The U.S.
mortgage crisis exposed enormous deficiencies in the operation of finance
202. As of 2007, for updated statistics see United States Department of the Treasury, available at
http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/.
203. American Home is not a sub-prime lender and specializes in providing mortgages to borrowers
who fall just short of top credit scores, known as Alt-A mortgages. Please see Steven Church and
Bradley Keoun, American Home Files for Bankruptcy After Shutdown (Update7), (August 6, 2007),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aRWALa9xlmA . Merrill Lynch &
Co. has raised the prospect of bankruptcy for Countrywide Financial Corp., who has been forced to
draw upon its entire $11.5 billion line of credit. Shannon D. Harrington and Hamish Risk, Corporate
Bond Risk Rises Worldwide as Credit Concerns Escalate, (August 16, 2007),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.czwlLMECo4.
204. In a move that leading to global market turmoil, BNP Paribas SA, France's largest bank, was
forced to stop withdrawals from three investment funds with high exposure to the sub-prime market.
Sebastian Boyd, BNP Paribas Freezes Funds as Loan Losses Roil Markets (Update5), (August 9,
2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aW I wj5i.vyOg.
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markets yet, according to Rosner, "there is still no focus on monitoring
bank funding markets. The feared outcome is nothing more than a 21st
century bank run, this time from CDO investors rather than depositors. '2 °s
The recent failure of two Bear Stern CDO hedge funds indicates this is
already under way.2"6 Global markets have seized on fears of an
international credit crisis, requiring government intervention in North
America, Europe and Asia.207 Whether or not this intervention is effective it
cannot be regarded as more than a short term fix.
The continuous cycle of international financial crises is a warning
signal that the global debt market is not functioning properly. Coordinated
international effort must target the failings of the market before it is too
late. International regulation will occur; it is a matter of hoping that the
catalyst for such development is not a financial catastrophe.
205. Rosner, supra note 10, at 83.
206. The two Bear Steams funds, the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage
Fund and High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, are reported to have little to no value left. The
two funds were formerly worth well over a billion dollars. Yalman Onaran, Bear Stearns Tells Fund
Investors 'No Value Left' (Update6), (July 18, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiMUHwcgLDKI.
207. The central banks of the U.S., Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada injected over $136 billion
into the banking system dunng the week of August 6, 2007, in attempt to relieve the global liquidity
crisis. Scott Lanman and Christian Vits, Central Banks Add Cash to Avert Crisis of Confidence
(Update9), (August 10, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aBHNFmbstWcY.
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